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I.

A.

TOMLINSON*

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

An acquittal terminates the criminal process in the defendant's
favor, but a conviction (even if affirmed on appeal) cannot have the
same conclusive effect. The severe and continuing nature of criminal punishment mandates that the state make available post-conviction mechanisms for challenging a conviction. This article, after
surveying the history and present operation of post-conviction relief
in the Maryland courts, recommends six statutory changes to make
the present system more efficient. The focus of this paper is the
Post Conviction Procedure Act' adopted by the legislature in 1958
and significantly amended in 1965, 1983, and 1986. Since the different post-conviction remedies are interdependent, this paper will
also analyze other post-conviction remedies available to state pris* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. The author acknowledges the generous support of the Maryland Bar Foundation. He is also thankful to the
many judges and practitioners who shared their experience and knowledge with him.
Needless to say, any responsibility for errors which remain rests solely with the author.
An earlier version of this article, prepared for the Criminal Law and Procedure Committee of the Maryland Judicial Conference, led to the Committee's approval of the proposed statutory amendments reproduced in Appendix A. Those amendments, except
where indicated, implement the recommendations presented in this article. The article,
unlike the proposed legislation, expresses only the views of its author and has not received any endorsement from either the Maryland Judicial Conference or the Maryland
Bar Foundation.
1. For the present codification of the Act, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645A, 645-I
(1982 & Supp. 1985).
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oners (i.e., habeas corpus 2 and coram nobis3 ). Efforts at reform
must address the whole system; otherwise, efficiencies achieved in
one area may cause overload in other areas.4
The present system of post-conviction relief allocates considerable public resources to the adjudication of prisoner claims that are
in most cases meritless. The justification for doing so is twofold.
First, the post-conviction process has become part of the process for
reviewing the validity of criminal convictions. Convicted defendants
may raise on post-conviction claims which they cannot raise on appeal (e.g., the ineffectiveness of counsel, the involuntariness of a
guilty plea, or the state's suppression of exculpatory evidence). Review of these types of claims has become an accepted part of the
criminal process. The fact that many if not most such claims lack
merit does not justify closing the courthouse door to all claimants.
To do so would be analogous to denying a defendant a trial or an
appeal because most defendants are found guilty.
Second, courts do have a special responsibility to verify the legality of any detention. Liberty, in the sense of freedom of movement, is the most basic of personal rights. Courts must therefore
respond to claims by prisoners that their incarceration is illegal.
The availability of such a remedy, despite the large number of meritless claims, is a necessary check against illegal confinements. The
label that the legislature gives to the remedy (i.e., habeas corpus or
post-conviction) is of little moment, but elimination of the remedy

2. For the present statutory provisions on habeas corpus, see MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-701 to 3-707 (1984 & Supp. 1985) and MD. R. Z40-Z56.
3. There are no statutes or rules governing coram nobis. For the present status of
the writ, see infra text accompanying notes 133-134, 177-179.
4. In 1986, the legislature adopted a piecemeal approach to reform when it
amended the Post Conviction Procedure Act to allow a prisoner only two post-conviction petitions in challenging convictions arising out of a single trial. See Act of May 27,
1986, ch. 647, 1986 Md. Laws 2387 (amending MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a), (f)
(1982 & Supp. 1985)). The handling of meritless subsequent petitions no doubt involves much waste, but this piecemeal approach is unlikely to provide lasting relief.
Once a prisoner realizes that the courts will not accept a third post-conviction petition,
the prisoner will simply relabel the filing an application for habeas corpus. The comprehensive approach suggested in this article, and in the legislation proposed by the Criminal Law and Procedure Committee of the Judicial Conference, provides more hope for
relief. The suggested approach allows, in effect, one post-conviction filing; if the prisoner makes any subsequent filings, however labeled, the primary issue would be whether
the prisoner had an adequate opportunity to present claims in the initial proceeding.
In 1986, the legislature did not have before it the proposed legislation found in
Appendix A. The legislature's adoption of a two-petition rule does not preclude subsequent consideration and adoption of more comprehensive reforms.
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would be undesirable and probably unconstitutional. 5
The present post-conviction system in Maryland functions reasonably well. There are nevertheless problem areas where improvements are possible. Judges complain that the present system does
not adequately protect the courts from the prisoner who abuses the
system by filing successive, and increasingly frivolous, applications
for relief.6 Filing fees and the assessment of costs, two means traditionally utilized to deter frivolous or vexatious litigation, do not
have the same effect on prisoner filings since most prisoners are indigent and all prisoners have a right of access to the courts to challenge their confinement. 7 In addition, a prisoner's delay in filing for
post-conviction relief may prejudice the state's ability to defend a
conviction.
The recommendations presented in this article seek to make the
present system for adjudicating post-conviction claims more efficient without undermining its fairness. The recommendations build
upon the principal strength of the present system: the guarantee of
a full evidentiary hearing with appointed counsel for each prisoner's
first petition filed under the Post Conviction Procedure Act. 8 This
allocation of resources to the adjudication of first petitions is appropriate, but the state should take better advantage of the attention
given first petitions. In particular, the state should broaden the
preclusive effect of the first post-conviction court's decision on all
subsequent prisoner filings. The state should also have available a
mechanism such as a laches defense to protect itself from a prisoner's inexcusable delay in the presentation of claims.
The thrust of the recommendations is thus to avoid duplicative
effort by making the prisoner's first filing under the Post Conviction
Procedure Act the focal point for all collateral relief. Habeas corpus
and coram nobis should play a subordinate role and be available
only as last-ditch remedies when a convicted defendant has no other
access to the courts. To accomplish this objective, the legislature
should consider the following six statutory changes: 9
1. The legislature should amend the Post Conviction Procedure Act to permit a convicted offender to file only one petition with
5. The state constitution provides: "The General Assembly shall pass no law suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." MD. CONST. art. III, § 55.
6. This particular complaint led to the 1986 amendment to the Post Conviction
Procedure Act discussed supra at note 4.
7. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(0 (Supp. 1985).
9. For a fuller discussion of these six recommendations, see Part IV of this article.
For statutory language implementing these recommendations, see Appendix A.
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respect to convictions arising from a single criminal trial. The petitioner should be required to include in the petition all available
grounds for relief. The Act should bar all subsequent petitions,
while allowing a petitioner to file a motion to reopen the original
proceeding on the following bases only: (a) the ineffectiveness of
post-conviction counsel; (b) the announcement, subsequent to the
disposition of the petition, of a new legal standard that applies retroactively; or (c) the discovery of facts, not known at the time of
disposition, that afford the petitioner grounds for relief."0
2. The legislature should amend the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to eliminate habeas corpus if the relief sought by
the prisoner is available under the Post Conviction Procedure Act.
Thus, if the applicant for habeas corpus had not previously filed a
petition under the Act, the judge should normally treat the habeas
corpus application as a post-conviction petition and transfer it to the
convicting court for disposition under the Act. Thejudge should do
so even if the prisoner does not consent.
3. The legislature should amend the Post Conviction Procedure Act to eliminate coram nobis as a duplicative remedy. Coram
nobis should be available only if post-conviction and habeas corpus
relief are no longer available (i.e., if the convicted offender is no
longer in custody).
4. The legislature should amend the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to specify the preclusive effect in habeas corpus
proceedings of prior post-conviction and habeas corpus proceedings. That amendment should prevent prisoners from circumventing the limit of one post-conviction petition through
subsequent habeas corpus filings. Further, to avoid duplicative effort by a succession of judges, the Court of Appeals should amend
the habeas corpus rules to permit the transfer of habeas corpus applications to the judge who conducted the post-conviction
proceeding.
5. The legislature should amend the Post Conviction Procedure Act to redefine "finally litigated" and "waived" consistently
with recent judicial decisions and these recommendations.
6. Finally, the legislature should amend the Post Conviction
Procedure Act to afford the state a laches defense when the prisoner's inexcusable delay in filing a post-conviction petition

10. The legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference Committee deletes item c.
See infra note 162 and recommendation I in Appendix A (proposed § 645A(g)).
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prejudiced the state's ability to respond to the petition."
The basic point of these recommendations is that post-conviction, like an appeal, should be a one-shot venture. Subject to very
limited exceptions, the convicted offender should obtain under the
Post Conviction Procedure Act one hearing, one trial court disposition, and one appeal. Any further relief sought by the prisoner
should be by way of habeas corpus or, in rare cases, by coram nobis.
Habeas corpus should not be available as a duplicative remedy for
prisoners, but should only become available after the prisoner has
exhausted the post-conviction remedy. Once habeas corpus does
become available, it should afford the prisoner only a limited opportunity to raise new allegations or relitigate old ones.' 2

11. The legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference Committee would also provide the state with a laches defense if the delay prejudiced the state's ability to retry the
petitioner. See infra note 193 and recommendation 6 in Appendix A (proposed
§ 645A(d)).
12. The acceptance of post-conviction proceedings as a standard part of the review
process suggests another, more radical reform. That reform would combine appellate
and post-conviction review into a unitary review proceeding. Promptly after a conviction, the trial court would conduct a post-conviction hearing. The trial record, supplemented by the post-conviction record, would provide the basis for a single appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals. See Robinson, ProposalandAnalysis of a Unitary System for Review
of CriminalJudgments, 54 B.U.L. REV. 485 (1974). The National Advisory Commission on
Courts has approved a similar reform. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS-REPORT ON COURTS,

Standards 6.1-6.8

(1973). The Commission's proposal did not include a mandatory, pre-appeal post-conviction hearing, but assigned to the appellate court the responsibility to do whatever was
necessary to decide on direct review all allegations of error, including allegations which
appellate courts normally relegate to post-conviction proceedings because of the absence of an adequate record. See Nejelski and Emory, UnifiedAppeal in State CriminalCases,
7 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 484 (1976).
Perhaps the new and untried nature of these proposals explains the failure of any
state to adopt them. One may also criticize these proposals on the ground that they will
spawn additional work for the courts. In Maryland there are roughly three times as
many appeals by convicted defendants as there are first post-conviction filings. See, e.g.,
ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND JUDICIARY

1983-84: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 35 (1984) (983 criminal appeals to the Court of Special
Appeals in fiscal 1984) and text infra at note 97 (370 first post-conviction petitions in
fiscal 1984). Expanding the scope of review on appeal may therefore create more work
for the courts without affording convicted defendants any additional relief, at least if we
assume that most, if not all, prisoners entitled to post-conviction relief are already seeking it. That assumption does not seem unreasonable, given the advisory service run by
the Public Defender's Office and the lack of merit in the overwhelming majority of postconviction petitions presently filed. This concern over an unnecessary increase in judicial business provides a sound basis for rejecting the unitary review model, or at least for
putting the proposal on the back burner.
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DEVELOPMENT OF POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES

A.

The Post Conviction Procedure Act

In 1958 the Maryland Legislature enacted the state's first Post
Conviction Procedure Act.' 3 The legislature modeled this Act on
the 1955 version of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.' 4
The impetus behind the Maryland legislation was the sharp increase
during the 1950s of habeas corpus applications filed by state prisoners. During the reporting year 1957-58, prisoners filed 495 applications for writs of habeas corpus in the trial courts of the state.' 5 A
substantial number of those cases reached the Maryland Court of
Appeals when the prisoner sought leave to appeal a circuit judge's
denial of the writ. In 1957 alone the Court of Appeals received 128
applications for leave to appeal which it disposed of in 104 published
opinions.' 6 Given the smaller and supposedly less litigious prison
population of that era, the number of prisoners challenging their
17
convictions through state habeas corpus was surprisingly large.
The legislative response to this burden was to establish in the Post
Conviction Procedure Act a new procedure for challenging a state
criminal conviction collaterally. The legislature evidently anticipated that the new procedure, which limited a prisoner to a single
petition without any right to appeal, would reduce the burden on
the courts.
The scope of the remedy as specified in the Act has remained
basically unchanged since 1958. The remedy is available to any person convicted of a crime and either incarcerated under sentence of
death or imprisonment or on parole or probation.' 8 Claims that
may be raised in a petition filed under the Act include the following:
(1) the sentence or judgment was imposed in violation of the Consti13. 1958 Md. Laws, ch. 44.
14. UNIF. POsT-CoNvICTION PROC. ACT, 9B U.L.A. 556-63 (1966).
15. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 1957-1958 23 (1958).
16. Id. at 20-21.
17. In June 1957, the Division of Correction housed 5,398 prisoners, as compared
with approximately 12,600 today. Telephone interview with Robert Gibson, Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (Aug. 6, 1986). In fiscal 1984, the
Court of Special Appeals disposed of 252 applications for leave to appeal in post-conviction cases. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND
JUDICIARY 1983-84: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 36 (1984). The number of post-conviction
petitions filed in the trial courts was between 550 and 650. See infra text accompanying
notes 91-96. Given the increase in the prison population, the percentage of prisoners
seeking post-conviction relief seems actually to have declined between 1957 and today.
18. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a) (Supp. 1985). Chapter 442 of 1965 Md. Laws
extended the provisions of the original Act to include convicted offenders who were no
longer incarcerated but on parole or probation.
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tution of the United States; (2) the sentence or judgment was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of Maryland; (3) the
court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (4) the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; and (5) the sentence
is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged
error which would otherwise be available under a writ of habeas
corpus, writ of coram nobis, or other common-law or statutory remedy.'" A convicted offender may file such a petition at any time so
long as he remains incarcerated or on parole or probation for the
offense. Unlike an application for a writ of habeas corpus, which a
prisoner may file with any state judge,2 0 a prisoner must file a postconviction petition in the circuit court for the county in which the
conviction took place. 2 '
The Maryland Legislature in 1958 intended to lighten the burden imposed by prisoners on the courts by limiting each offender to
one post-conviction petition in the trial court and one opportunity
to seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals. 2 2 A Chief Judge
of the Maryland Court of Appeals had observed prior to the passage
of the Act that in most of the habeas corpus cases reaching the
Court of Appeals, the applicant had filed "one or more (sometimes
many) previous applications which had been denied."12 ' The Legislature sought to restrict the filing of successive petitions through the
single petition rule found in section 645-H of the Act as originally
enacted. That section, which derived almost verbatim from section
8 of the Uniform Act, provided that a petitioner must raise in the
initial petition "all grounds of relief claimed. ' '24 Grounds not raised
were waived "unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition
finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could not reasonably
have been raised in the original or amended petition."' 2 5 The Commissioners' Note to section 8 of the Uniform Act recognized that the
purpose of that provision was to prevent "repetitive petitions" by
19.
20.
(1982)
21.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a) (Supp. 1985).

MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-701 (1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594D
(district court judges).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a) (Supp. 1985).

22. Comment, Maryland Version of the Uniform Post Conviction ProcedureAct, with Special
Reference to the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 19 MD. L. REV. 233 (1959).
23. Markell, Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas Corpus and by Appeal, 101 U.
PA. L. REV. 1154, 1161 (1953). The author of this article, the Honorable Charles Markell,
was an Associate Judge of the Maryland Court of Appeals from 1945 until he became
ChiefJudge on September 8, 1952. He served as ChiefJudge until retiring on December 16, 1952.
24. 1958 Md. Laws ch. 44, § 1.
25. Id.
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limiting the petitioner in most cases to a single petition. 26 Subsequent petitions were allowable only if they raised grounds that the
petitioner could not have raised in the first petition.
In 1959, the General Assembly reinforced the single petition
rule by authorizing the post-conviction court summarily to dismiss a
subsequent petition, unless the petition raised additional grounds
that the petitioner could not "reasonably have raised" in the initial
petition. 2 7 Perhaps the legislature in 1958 and 1959 was unduly optimistic in believing it could use waiver to limit most offenders to one
petition, but that certainly appeared to be the intent. Otherwise, the
burden on the courts under the Act would be similar or even greater
than before the Act's enactment. This is so because prisoners would
simply label their multiple filings "post-conviction petitions" rather
than "habeas corpus applications."
The Post Conviction Procedure Act, as introduced in the 1958
legislature, 2s further lightened the burden on the courts by superseding the habeas corpus remedy in cases covered by the Act. If an
application for habeas corpus raised claims entertainable under the
new Act, the bill required the judge to transmit the application to
the court in which the applicant's conviction took place for disposition as a post-conviction petition. 29 This approach was consistent
with section 1 of the Uniform Act, which provided that the new postconviction remedy should replace all previously available state remedies for challenging the validity of incarceration under sentences of
death or imprisonment. 30 At some point the legislature amended
the bill to require the applicant's consent for post-conviction treatment of a habeas corpus application. 3' The apparent reason for this
change was the legislature's concern that restricting access to the
writ might constitute a suspension of the writ in violation of the
Maryland constitution.3 2 While this concern may well have been unfounded,33 the legislature preferred to adopt the safer course.
26. UNIV. POST-CONVICTION PROC. ACT, 9B U.L.A. 556, 561 (1966).
27. 1959 Md. Laws ch. 429, § I (amending MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645H (Supp.
1958)).
28. Senate Bill 14 (printed in 1958 Md. Laws ch. 44).
29. Id.
30. 9B U.L.A. at 550-51.
31. Section 645-B(b) as adopted in 1958. See supra note 24. This provision may now
be found in MD. R. Z55.
32. See supra note 5.

33. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the post-conviction remedy established by Congress for federal prisoners even though that remedy superseded
federal habeas corpus. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). The federal statute provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a federal prisoner shall
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The safer course avoided the constitutional issue but had its
own built-in disadvantage. Given the preservation of the habeas
remedy, the Post Conviction Procedure Act does not provide a "single" 3 4 or "comprehensive '8 5 remedy for challenging criminal convictions, despite the Court of Appeals' penchant for describing it in
those terms. Habeas corpus (and perhaps also coram nobis) remains available as a separate, duplicative remedy. However, the
1958 legislature did encourage the use of the new post-conviction
remedy by authorizing an aggrieved prisoner to seek leave to appeal
from a circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief. At the same
time, the General Assembly precluded all appeals in habeas corpus
and coram nobis cases in which the relief sought by the prisoner was
also available under the Post Conviction Procedure Act. 36 Thus, the
legality of a prisoner's confinement may still be challenged through
habeas corpus, but no appeal lies from the denial of a habeas application. Further, the judge must dispose of a habeas application
under the habeas corpus rules unless the prisoner consents to its
The continued availabilty
treatment as a post-conviction petition.
of coram nobis as a duplicative remedy is more doubtful, not because of anything said in the Act, but because of the Court of Appeals' earlier holding that the writ does not lie where the party has
an adequate remedy under an existing statutory procedure."
B.

Post-Conviction and Habeas Corpus Compared

The post-conviction and habeas corpus remedies have existed
side-by-side from 1958 until the present, assuring a prisoner of at
least two filings and two trial court determinations (although only
one opportunity to seek leave to appeal). The post-conviction remedy, which guarantees a first-time petitioner a hearing in court with
counsel,3 9 is the procedurally favored remedy. The scope of the
post-conviction remedy is also broader. The post-conviction court
may decide all legal or constitutional claims affecting the validity of
not be entertained "unless it ...

appears that the post-conviction remedy

.

.. is inade-

quate or ineffective to test the legality of [the] detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982). No
court has ever found the federal post-conviction remedy under § 2255 to be inadequate
or ineffective.
34. See Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 544, 386 A.2d 336, 338 (1978).
35. Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 22, 400 A.2d 406, 407 (1979).
36. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(e) (1982) (originally § 645A(b)).
37. MD. R. Z55 (derived from MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645-B(b) as enacted in
1958).
38. Bernard v. State, 193 Md. 1,4, 65 A.2d 297, 298 (1949).
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(f) (Supp. 1985).
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the conviction, while the habeas corpus court must limit its review to
claims that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction or violated the
defendant's fundamental rights.
Until the middle of this century, a prisoner could raise on state
habeas corpus only jurisdictional questions, 40 but in the 1940s and
1950s the Maryland Court of Appeals followed the example of the
Supreme Court in broadening the scope of the writ to include alleged violations of fundamental rights. 4 ' In those "exceptional
cases," habeas corpus became available because it was the only effective means to preserve basic constitutional rights. 4 2 This evolution of the writ ceased after the legislature in 1958 abolished
prisoner appeals in habeas corpus cases.4" That legislative action
froze the law of habeas corpus because appellate courts no longer
issued opinions in cases involving the writ. 4 4 Despite nearly thirty
years of silence from the state appellate courts, it is generally assumed that the issues that can be raised under the Post Conviction
Procedure Act remain to some significant extent broader than those
that can be raised under habeas corpus.4 5
1. Res Judicata and Waiver on Habeas Corpus.-While the substantive scope of the remedy available under the Post Conviction
Procedure Act is broader than the remedy available on habeas
corpus, the court's authority to decide the merits of issues raised by
the prisoner is considerably greater on habeas corpus. This anomaly results from differences in the applicable estoppel and waiver
standards. The Post Conviction Procedure Act, as originally enacted, barred the consideration of alleged errors that the petitioner
had "previously and finally litigated or waived in the proceedings
40. See, e.g., State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572 (1880).
41. For example, the court broadened the scope of the writ to include coerced waivers of counsel or jury trial, involuntary guilty pleas, or the state's presentation of perjured testimony. See Markell, supra note 23, at 1160-61.
42. Loughran v. Warden of Maryland House of Corrections, 192 Md. 719, 724-25, 64
A.2d 712, 714 (1949).
43. An appeal is available to the state if a habeas corpus judge discharges a prisoner
on the ground that the law under which conviction took place is unconstitutional. MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-706 (1984).
44. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over habeas corpus appeals from 1945 to
1958. Judge Markell believed that the 200-odd opinions published by the court prior to
1953 made "no marked contribution to the literature of the law." Markell, supra note 23,
at 1161. In most of these cases the court refused to address the issues raised by the prisoner, ruling that "habeas corpus cannot be used as an appeal or new trial." Id. at 1160.
45. For the further evolution of the federal writ to encompass all federal constitutional or legal issues affecting the validity of a conviction, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953).
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resulting in the conviction ... 46 While the original Act did not
define the terms "finally litigated" or "waived," the structure of section 645A(a) communicated a good deal about the meaning of those
terms. The phrases "finally litigated" and "waived" appeared after
the list of alleged errors that a prisoner may raise under the Act. A
prisoner may raise any of the listed errors "provided that the alleged error has not been previously and finally litigated or
47
waived.'
Thus, it appears that the statutory requirement that the prisoner not have finally litigated or waived an allegation of error is a
prerequisite to the post-conviction court's addressing the allegation.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court of Special Appeals has
expressly construed section 645A(a) in that jurisdictional fashion.
However, most judges and practitioners assume that if the state
claims that the prisoner has finally litigated or waived an error alleged in a post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court must
resolve the res judicata and waiver issues in the prisoner's favor
before it decides the merits.
The doctrines of res judicata and waiver have never applied so
inflexibly to habeas corpus and coram nobis. Indeed, it is blackletter law that the common law doctrine of res judicata does not
apply at all on habeas corpus.4 8 As a result, a habeas court has the
authority to relitigate issues resolved against the prisoner at trial or
on appeal. Federal courts often relitigate federal constitutional issues in a habeas action brought by a state prisoner.4 9 The same
relitigation may also occur when the habeas court and the convicting
court are part of the same judicial system. Thus, a federal habeas
court may relitigate issues resolved against a federal prisoner by a
federal trial or appellate court.5 ° In addition, habeas courts have
traditionally adopted a flexible approach in allowing a prisoner to
raise issues he did not raise at trial or on appeal rather than apply

46. 1958 Md. Laws ch. 44, § 1 (adding MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a)).
47. Id.
48. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963). See also Kelley, Finality and Habeas
Corpus: Is the Rule that Res Judicata May Not Apply to Habeas Corpus or Motion to Vacate Still
Viable? 78 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1975).
49. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
50. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 33 (1974). In Davis, the federal prisoner
sought post-conviction relief under § 2255, but the Court has treated that statutory remedy as the equivalent of habeas corpus for federal prisoners. For the difficulties raised
by this power to relitigate, see Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
1528-31 (2d ed. 1973) and 423-25 (Supp. 1981).
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rigid rules of waiver. 5 '
Habeas courts have also consistently refused to apply the doctrines of res judicata and waiver to bar successive applications from
the same prisoner. Thus, the dismissal of an earlier application did
not bar a subsequent application raising the same or different
claims. This reluctance to limit the prisoner to a single application
was due in large part to the fact that the common-law writ developed at a time when prisoners did not have access to legal assistance. 52 Courts were unwilling to hold that an uncounseled prisoner
could not raise in a subsequent application potentially meritorious
claims. As a result, the doctrine of resjudicata never applied to successive habeas corpus applications. Prisoners could go from judge
to judge until "unsuccessful in requesting relief from twelve," they
could obtain release by the "wrongheadedness of a thirteenth."5 3
Similarly, prisoners could raise new grounds in a subsequent application unless they had abused the writ by deliberately withholding
such grounds from an earlier application.5 4 Under this approach,
courts gave weight to prior determinations on the merits and sought
to prevent abuses of the writ, but decided subsequent applications
on the merits if justice so required. 5
Statutory and rule provisions permit Maryland judges in habeas
cases to give some finality to earlier denials of the writ, but the pro51. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) (federal habeas corpus action by federal
prisoner).

52. L.

YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES

§§ 150-51 (1981).

53. Eshugbayi Eleko v. Nigeria, 1928 A.C. 459.
54. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1963).
55. Federal judges may give controlling weight to the denial of relief in an earlier
proceeding if "1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, 2) the prior determination was
on the merits, and 3) the ends ofjustice would not be served by reaching the merits of
the subsequent application." Sanders, 373 U.S. at 15. Similarly, the Sanders Court permitted a prisoner to raise new grounds in a subsequent application unless the prisoner
"deliberately bypassed" an opportunity in a prior proceeding to raise and have adjudicated those grounds. Id. at 17. The Court based its rulings in large part on the history of
the writ.
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986), a plurality of fourJustices limited
"the ends of justice" permitting relitigation of claims previously decided against the
prisoner to cover only cases where the prisoner made a colorable show of innocence. Id.
at 2622-28 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and O'Connor,
JJ.). A majority of the Justices rejected that limitation, either explicitly in dissent, id. at
2631 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.) and at 2639 (opinion of Stevens, J.),
or implicitly by refusing to join those portions of Justice Powell's opinion (White and
Blackmun, JJ.). The dissenters favored granting the lower federal courts more discretion to entertain successive petitions. They would have permitted relitigation where the
prisoner invoked intervening court decisions in support of a post-conviction claim.
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visions are unclear if not inconsistent. In addition, neither the statute nor the rules address the preclusive effect on a prisoner's claim
of an adverse ruling at trial or on direct review or of the prisoner's
failure even to raise the claim. These lacunae increase the difficulty
of comparing the relief presently available under habeas corpus with
that available on post-conviction.
The Maryland Legislature amended the habeas corpus statute
in 1941 and 1945 to increase a judge's authority summarily to refuse a
grant of the writ. Prior to 1941, it was evidently common practice in
Maryland for judges to issue the writ as a matter of course. 5 6 That
is, the judge brought the prisoner to court to inquire into the legality of the detention and then decided whether to discharge the prisoner. This practice permitted prisoners to obtain an "intermission
of imprisonment through excursions to distant counties at public
expense." 5 7 The legislature itself had contributed to this practice by
providing that a judge would be liable to the party aggrieved for a
refusal to grant the writ.5" In 1941 the legislature repealed that provision and added a new provision which allowed the judge, without
holding a hearing, to refuse to issue the writ, if "it appear[ed] from
the complaint itself or the documents annexed that the petitioner
would not be entitled to any relief."5 9
In 1945 the legislature went one step further and addressed the
problem posed by successive applications for the writ. The legislature left to the judge's "discretion" whether to issue the writ if the
applicant had already received "a hearing on a prior application for
release from confinement under the same commitment." The legislature instructed the judge, when exercising that discretion, to consider whether the subsequent application contained "new grounds
of a substantial nature" and whether any previously raised grounds
had been "fully and adequately presented" in the prior application.6 ° This language did not require, or even permit, habeas
judges to apply principles of res judicata to dismiss subsequent applications for the writ. The judge must exercise discretion to insure
that justice is done, but in doing so, a prior judge's refusal to issue
56. Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md. 341, 347, 44 A.2d 807, 810 (1951).
57. Id.
58. That provision, codified as § 14 of article 42 prior to 1941, derived from the English habeas corpus statute, 37 Car. II, ch.2 (1679).
59. 1941 Md. Laws ch. 484, § 1 (amending MD. ANN. CODE art. 42, § 3 (1939)). That
provision is now found in MD. R. Z44(1).
60. 1945 Md. Laws ch. 702, § I (adding MD. ANN. CODE art. 42, § 3A). Section 3-703
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article presently contains this provision almost
verbatim.
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the writ is given great deference. The legislature permitted this deference because in the same year (1945) it authorized, for the first
time, an appeal to the Court of Appeals by an aggrieved applicant
for the writ. 6 In the legislature's opinion, it was preferable to allow
the prisoner to appeal to the Court of Appeals rather than to every
other judge in the State. Under the latter procedure one judge
might set at naught the judgment of all the other judges on whether
to release a prisoner on habeas corpus.6 2
Given the aggrieved applicant's new right of appeal, it is unclear why the legislature did not opt for the applicability of res judicata. Perhaps there was concern about applying the doctrine against
an uncounseled applicant or to cases where liberty was at stake. In
any event, the Court of Appeals, when it first promulgated habeas
corpus rules in 1961,63 took the legislature's concern for finality one
step further. In what is now Maryland Rule Z44(2), the court came
still closer to applying principles of res judicata to bar subsequent
applications. At the same time, the court seemingly allowed a prisoner unlimited freedom to raise new grounds for relief. That rule
provides that a judge may refuse to grant the writ to a convicted
offender, if "the legality of the confinement was determined upon a
prior application for the writ or other post-conviction proceeding,
and no new ground is shown sufficient to warrant issuance of the
writ." 64
Rule Z44(2) differs from the 1945 statute 65 in at least two respects. First, the rule makes no explicit reference to the judge's
"discretion" in deciding whether to refuse issuance of the writ on a
subsequent application. Second, the rule requires the judge to consider new grounds raised in a subsequent application, as opposed
simply to considering the newness of the grounds as a factor in deciding whether summarily to deny the writ. Perhaps these differences are not as great as they appear since the rule only provides
that the judge "may" refuse to grant the writ on a subsequent appli61. 1945 Md. Laws ch. 702, § I (adding MD. ANN. CODE art. 42, § 3C). In 1947 the
legislature once again amended § 3C to require the aggrieved applicant to first seek
leave to appeal. 1947 Md. Laws ch. 625. The legislature abolished habeas corpus appeals in cases in which the prisoner was challenging a criminal conviction when it enacted the Post Conviction Procedure Act in 1958. 1958 Md. Laws ch. 44.
62. See Markell, supra note 23, at 1157.
63. TWENTIETH REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (September 1961), as adopted by the Court of Appeals on September 15,
1961. See Order Adopting Rules of Practice and Procedure, MD. R. at 13-14 (1963 ed.).

64. MD.R. Z44(2).
65. Now codified as

MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-703 (1984).
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cation (i.e., principles of res judicata are not binding). Also minimizing the discrepancy is the rule's requirement that the judge
determine whether a new ground is "sufficient" before resolving it.
Nevertheless, Rule Z44(2) is inconsistent with the earlier statutory
provision. While the state may argue under the rule that the habeas
judge should treat a claim as barred because "finally litigated," the
rule gives little or no leeway to the state to argue that a claim is
barred because the prisoner waived it. The statute also provides little support for a waiver argument, but it does confer broad discretion on the habeas judge to resolve on the merits grounds
previously raised by the prisoner.
2. Res Judicata and Waiver on Post-Conviction.-The rules of
waiver and resjudicata applicable to claims raised in post-conviction
petitions have also undergone a number of changes over the years.
In 1965, seven years after the passage of the original Post Conviction
Procedure Act, the legislature amended it to reduce significantly the
role of waiver and, to a lesser extent, res judicata. The original Act
had provided that the post-conviction court could not decide any
alleged error that the petitioner had "previously and finally litigated
or waived" in the criminal proceeding itself or in any other proceeding to secure relief from the conviction. 66 The Act did not define
those terms other than to provide that failure to include an available
ground in the original petition constituted a waiver.6 7 In 1965 the
legislature added section 645A(c), which defined waiver to be the
"intelligent and knowing" failure to make an allegation of error that
could have been made at trial, on direct appeal, or in any habeas
corpus, coram nobis, or prior post-conviction proceeding actually
instituted by the petitioner. 68 At the same time, the legislature repealed the original section 645-H which provided that the petitioner
waived all available claims not included in the first petition.6 9
By defining waiver this way, the 1965 legislature adopted the
deliberate bypass test formulated by the Supreme Court in Fay v.
Noia.7 ° Under that approach, a prisoner could raise a claim not
raised at trial or on appeal as long as the prior failure to present the
claim was not a deliberate (i.e., knowing and intelligent) bypass of
66. 1958 Md. Laws ch. 44, § 1 (original § 645A(a)).
67. Id. at § 1 (original § 645-H).
68. 1965 Md. Laws ch. 442, § 1. Subsection 645A(c) still contains nearly identical
language.
69. 1965 Md. Laws ch. 442, § 2.
70. 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963). The Court of Appeals so described the legislature's
action. Bristow v. State, 242 Md. 283, 289, 219 A.2d 33, 37 (1966).
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an available remedy. The legislature applied that formulation not
only to grounds that the petitioner failed to raise at trial and on
appeal but also to grounds not raised in an earlier collateral
7
proceeding. '
The new definition of waiver made it more difficult for the postconviction court to find a waiver and thus avoid reaching the merits
of the prisoner's claim. While the new subsection did contain a rebuttable presumption that a previous failure to raise an allegation
constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver, 72 in practice the prisoner could rebut the presumption merely by stating in the petition
that there was no awareness of the alleged error at the time of the
failure to raise it. The effect of this change was especially pronounced with respect to new grounds raised in subsequent petitions-grounds that the courts had previously considered waived
under the single petition rule.
The purpose of the 1965 amendment was fairly apparent. The
Court in Noia had refused to honor state procedural defaults (i.e.,
the failure of the prisoner to raise a claim at the proper time in the
state courts) as a bar to federal habeas corpus relief unless the default involved a deliberate bypass of state remedies. Thus, if state
courts wished to limit federal court interference, they would need to
loosen their own waiver rules to conform with Noa. Otherwise, the
state prisoner could go right to federal court where the judge would
most likely hold a hearing because of the absence of any resolution
of the claim in the state court. As a defensive mechanism to hold off
the federal judges, the legislature greatly limited the notion of
waiver and opened up state post-conviction to many new claims. In
a sense, the legislature only ratified what post-conviction courts
73
were already doing in reaction to Noia.
Subsequent events upset the legislature's calculations. In particular, the federal judges largely withdrew from the scene. In Wainwright v. Sykes," 4 the Supreme Court rejected the deliberate bypass
standard. The Court held that to raise on federal habeas corpus a
claim not raised in state court, a state prisoner must establish cause

71. The Supreme Court, in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1963), applied a similar definition of waiver to prior post-conviction filings by federal prisoners.
72. 1965 Md. Laws ch. 442, § I (presently codified in the second paragraph of
§ 645A(c)).
73. Gleaton v. Warden of Maryland House of Corrections, 238 Md. 135, 135-36, 207
A.2d 652, 652-53 (1965) (Supreme Court's waiver doctrine applied by Maryland courts
as a matter of expediency).
74. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the alleged federal constitutional error.
The legislature did not react to the retreat of the federal judges
in Sykes, as it had to their advance in Noa, by amending the Post
Conviction Procedure Act. Perhaps the legislature would have done
so eventually, but the Court of Appeals in the year following Sykes
made any legislative response unnecessary. In Curtis v. State, 75 the
court held the definition of waiver in section 645A(c) applied only to
allegations of error for which federal law required a knowing and
intelligent waiver. The Curtis court identified certain fundamental
rights for which the Supreme Court had traditionally required a
knowing and intelligent waiver. 7 6 In doing so the Court of Appeals
assumed that Noa retained some vitality and that the Supreme
Court would still require a knowing and intelligent waiver to bar
federal habeas review of alleged denials of those rights. With respect to other constitutional rights, the Curtis court observed that
the Supreme Court did not require a knowing and intelligent waiver
of such rights as a prerequisite to barring the defendant from subsequently asserting the right in federal court. The Curtis court reasoned that the legislature could not have intended its requirement
of a knowing and intelligent waiver to govern those situations.
The aftermath of Curtis is that the determination of the applicable waiver standard in post-conviction proceedings is unclear. Postconviction courts must identify those fundamental rights requiring a
knowing and intelligent waiver and must formulate the waiver standard applicable to those rights which do not require a knowing and
intelligent waiver. Despite the paucity of case law, it seems likely
77
that the Curtis list of fundamental rights is fairly comprehensive.
On the issue of the waiver standard applicable to nonfundamental rights, the Court of Appeals has not formulated a single
waiver standard. The court has focused on "tactical decisions" by
counsel and the "inaction" of counsel or of the defendant as bases
for precluding the defendant from subsequently raising an allega-

75. 284 Md. 132, 138-40, 395 A.2d 464, 468-69 (1978).
76. The fundamental rights identified included the right to counsel, to jury trial, to
plead not guilty, to plead the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right not to be
subject to double jeopardy. Id. at 142-44, 395 A.2d at 470-7 1.
77. In Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 24-31, 400 A.2d 406, 408-12 (1979), the Court of
Appeals refused to characterize as a fundamental right correct jury instructions on an
alibi defense. On the other hand, the court has recognized as a fundamental right the
defendant's right to be personally present at trial to confront his accusers. Williams v.
State, 292 Md. 201, 219, 438 A.2d 1301, 1309-10 (1981).
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tion of error.7" Certainly the court has come close, with respect to
nonfundamental rights, to substituting the notion of procedural default for that of waiver. Under the procedural default approach, the
defendant does not lose a right (constitutional or otherwise) by any
personal decision to relinquish it, but by operation of law (i.e., by
failing to assert it at the proper time).79 Inaction, or the failure to
make an objection at the proper time, constitutes a waiver or, as
relabeled by Professor Westen, a "forfeiture."" °
In 1965, the legislature also amended the Act to define "finally
litigated,"'" but that definition has not generated any difficulties
comparable to those raised by the definition of "waiver." Under the
statutory definition 82 a prisoner cannot relitigate an allegation of error on post-conviction, if the Court of Special Appeals has rejected
the claim on direct appeal or on leave to appeal from an earlier postconviction proceeding. In those cases the Court of Special Appeals
decision is res judicata. Decisions adverse to the petitioner by trial
courts do not have the same preclusive effect, but the prisoner's fail83
ure to appeal from a trial court decision may constitute a waiver.
C. Summary: Overlapping Remedies
The Post Conviction Procedure Act does not provide, as originally intended, a single, comprehensive remedy for challenging
criminal convictions collaterally. Habeas corpus survives as a separate remedy which a prisoner may invoke prior to, simultaneously
with, or subsequent to post-conviction. The relationship between
the two remedies remains undefined. Differences in the scope of the
two remedies and in the applicable rules of waiver and res judicata
compound the confusion caused by this overlap. The legislature has
78. Curtis, 284 Md. at 147, 149, 395 A.2d at 473, 474.
79. See generally Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationalefor the Forfeiture of Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977).
80. Id.
81. 1965 Md. Laws ch. 442, § 1 (adding a new § 645A(b)).
82. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(b) (1982).
83. In a peculiar exception to this rule denying preclusive effect to trial court decisions, the statutory definition of"finally litigated" does give such effect to a decision by
a circuit judge upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus or coram nobis previously
filed by the post-conviction petitioner, unless the decision on the earlier application is
"clearly erroneous." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(b) (1982). Wisely, the Attorney
General's Office does not invoke this latter provision, which is a potential trap for the
unwary pro se prisoner who applies for a writ of habeas corpus without realizing the
possible preclusive effect of a trial court denial. Interview with Deborah K. Chasanow,
Esq., Chief, Criminal Appeals and Correctional Litigation Division, Office of the Attorney General (May 1985).
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made post-conviction the favored remedy by affording post-conviction petitioners additional procedural rights (e.g., appointed counsel, a hearing, and leave to appeal). These advantages naturally
encourage the use of the Post Conviction Procedure Act by state
prisoners. The 1986 statutory change8 4 limiting prisoners to two
post-conviction petitions should lead to a revival of prisoner interest
in habeas corpus-a revival that will require the courts to struggle
further to define the differences between the two remedies. A more
unified approach appears desirable.
Before presenting such an approach, it is necessary to describe
in greater detail the present functioning of the Post Conviction Procedure Act.
III.

PRACTICE UNDER THE MARYLAND POST CONVICTION
PROCEDURE ACT

A.

The Post-Conviction Process

The court rules governing post-conviction proceedings establish informal, nontechnical procedures for the disposition of postconviction petitions. On matters of procedure, the approach of the
present rules 85 does not differ significantly from that of the rules
initially promulgated by the Court of Appeals in 1961.86 To initiate a
proceeding under the Act, a prisoner need only file a petition stating: (1) The petitioner's name, place of confinement, and inmate
identification number; (2) the place and date of trial, the offense for
which the petitioner was convicted, and the sentence imposed;
(3) the allegations of error upon which the petition is based; (4) a
concise statement of facts supporting the allegations of error;
(5) the relief sought; (6) a statement of all previous proceedings,
including appeals, motions for new trial, previous post-conviction
petitions, and any resulting determinations; and (7) a statement of
the facts or special circumstances that show that the allegations of
error have not been waived.8 7 The petition shall also state whether
the petitioner is able to pay the costs of the proceeding or to employ
counsel. Finally, the court shall "freely allow" amendments to the
petition in order to do substantial justice. 88
Upon receipt of a petition, the court clerk shall notify the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See infra note 4.
MD. R. 4-401 to 4-408.
See supra note 63.
MD. R. 4 -402(a).
MD. R. 4 -402(c).
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county administrative judge and the state's attorney." The only additional pleading permitted by the rules is the response which the
state's attorney must file within fifteen days after receiving notice of
the petition.9 ° The rules are silent on what may be pleaded in the
response; most state's attorneys file a standard or set response
which does no more than deny the prisoner's claims.
1. The Number of Petitions.-It is difficult to ascertain the
number of post-conviction petitions filed annually. The Administrative Office of the Courts reports that state prisoners filed 401 petitions during fiscal 1984, but this figure, although comparable to the
reported figures for prior years, is plainly too low. 9 ' First, the Administrative Office's table in the 1984 statistical abstract reports that
circuit courts in five counties have not experienced any filings in recent years. 9 2 These figures obvsiously are in error. The explanation
lies in the fact that the clerks in those courts have not separately
reported post-conviction filings, but have included those filings in
the miscellaneous law category. The clerk's office in Baltimore
County, for example, confirms that during fiscal 1984 there were in
fact forty-five post-conviction petitions filed in Baltimore County,
but the office did not separately report that figure to the Administrative Office.9 3 These filings, therefore, are not included in the 401
annual filings reported by the Administrative Office. If one makes
similar adjustments for the other non-reporting counties, the
number of annual post-conviction filings rises to approximately
550.,9
The reported figures also understate the number of post-conviction proceedings because they usually do not include applications
for habeas corpus, treated with the consent of the applicant, as post89. MD. R. 4-403.
90. MD. R. 4-404.
91. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLANDJUDICIARY 1983-84: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 75 (1984).

92. Those counties are Allegheny, Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Frederick, and
Worchester. Id.
93. Interview with Baltimore County Chief Deputy Clerk Wylie L. Ritchey, Jr. (May

1985).
94. The new criminal rules, effective July 1, 1984, explicitly provide that a post-conviction petition shall be filed in the original criminal action rather than in the miscellaneous law category. MD. R. 4-403. This change should have ensured full reporting of
post-conviction petitions; but the recently released statistics for fiscal 1985 report only
355 petitions. Ten counties (including the non-reporting counties cited in note 92 supra,
except for Anne Arundel) still report no post-conviction petitions. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND JUDICIARY 1984-1985 A-31
(1985).
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conviction petitions. 5 Normally, a judge who receives a habeas
corpus application seeking post-conviction relief sends the prisoner
a form letter requesting consent to the application's treatment as a
post-conviction petition. Many, if not most, prisoners do consent;
but the written consent filed with the judge does not change or affect the prisoner's original filing in the clerk's office. In most counties, the clerk's office still counts that filing as a habeas corpus
application. For example, the seventy-five post-conviction filings reported by Prince George's County for fiscal 1984 accurately report
the number of prisoner filings designated by the prisoner as postconviction petitions, but this number does not include the roughly
twenty to thirty habeas corpus applications processed under the
Post Conviction Procedure Act.9 6
Determining the number of filings that are first-time post-conviction petitions and those that are subsequent petitions is also difficult. Clerks' offices do not collect those statistics. One Baltimore
City judge, between 1977 and 1983, disposed of by written opinion
seventy petitions for post-conviction relief. Fifty-one of those petitions were first petitions, twelve were second petitions, and seven
were third or later petitions. 9 7 Thus, fifty-one out of seventy petitions, or roughly two-thirds of the petitions filed, were first petitions. That ratio appears to be accurate state-wide. Thus, out of the
550 post-conviction filings during fiscal 1984, there were roughly
370 first petitions and 180 subsequent petitions. In addition, an indeterminate number of habeas corpus applications (probably no
more than 100) were treated as post-conviction petitions with the
consent of the prisoner. The great majority of those applications
were undoubtedly subsequent filings, because applicants for habeas
corpus have every incentive to file directly under the Post Conviction Procedure Act if they have not already filed a first petition.
Therefore, the number of first petitions disposed of by the courts
during fiscal 1984 was not much greater than 370. If one assumes
that at least some of the subsequent filers had already submitted a
petition during the fiscal year, the number of prisoners who sought
some form of post-conviction relief is not much over 600.

95. See MD. R. Z55.
96. Interview with the Honorable Audrey E. Melbourne, Associate Judge, Maryland
Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit (May 1985).
97. Statistics provided by the Honorable Joseph H. H. Kaplan, Associate Judge,
Maryland Circuit Court for the Eighth Judicial Circuit. In addition, Judge Kaplan reported that 13 petitioners withdrew their petitions prior to any determination thereon.
Interview with the Honorable Joseph H. H. Kaplan (May 1985).
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Several things are striking about these figures. First, the
number of initial filings under the Post Conviction Procedure Act is
surprisingly low given the prison population of the state. In calendar year 1984, the Division of Correction received 4,862 inmates
committed by the courts. 98 If one assumes that all of the approximately 370 first-time petitioners for post-conviction relief were inmates of the Division, which is not likely, less than ten percent of the
convicted defendants who are committed to the Division seek some
form of post-conviction relief. Second, the number of prisoners filing subsequent post-conviction petitions is also surprisingly small.
As will be seen below, these petitions pose special problems for the
judges who must rule upon them, although the burden involved
should not be exaggerated. During the calendar year 1984, roughly
280 of the Division's 12,200 plus inmates filed subsequent petitions.
Even this figure is a bit high because it counts all habeas corpus
applications processed under the Act as subsequent petitions. Finally, the reported filings of post-conviction petitions include filings
withdrawn by the petitioner before a hearing or other disposition.
Rule 4-405 gives the petitioner an unlimited right to withdraw a
post-conviction petition without prejudice before the date of a
scheduled hearing. Roughly fifteen percent of the filed petitions are
withdrawn. While these withdrawals further lighten the post-conviction workload, both the court and counsel may have expended considerable time and effort on a petition that the petitioner then
decides to withdraw without prejudice.
There is no question that most post-conviction petitions are
meritless in the sense that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.
In fact, the petitioner receives no relief at all in the overwhelming
majority of the proceedings. The most common relief afforded is a
belated appeal, due to counsel's ineffectiveness in preserving the
defendant's right to appeal, 9 9 or a reduction in sentence.' 0 0 The
petitioner obtains a new trial in probably no more than one case out
of a hundred at best. The low number of petitions with merit is in
large part a reflection of the checking function of post-conviction
relief. The effective functioning of a post-conviction relief system
does not depend on the merit of the petitions filed.

98.
Safety
99.
100.

Intake statistics supplied by Robert Gibson, Maryland Department of Public
and Correctional Services (on file with author).
See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 284 Md. 664, 399 A.2d 256 (1979).
The same relief is usually available to the prisoner under MD. R. 4-345(a)-(b).
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2. Proceduresfor Handling Petitions.-The Post Conviction Procedure Act and the rules that implement it distinguish the procedures applicable to first petitions from those applicable to
subsequent petitions. In 1983, the legislature amended the Act to
recognize explicitly the right of a petitioner to a hearing and to the
assistance of counsel on a first petition."' As a result, all first petitioners are now represented by counsel and appear in court for a
hearing. On subsequent petitions, the court must determine
10 2
whether to grant a hearing or to appoint counsel.
The 1983 statutory amendment did not change existing practice
because most judges were already appointing counsel and holding
hearings on first petitions. Rather, the amendment's purpose was to
clarify that trial judges, in post-conviction proceedings, had the authority to deny subsequent petitions without holding a hearing or
appointing counsel. Prior to 1983, many judges had held hearings
on subsequent petitions because there was no provision for denying
a petition without a hearing. Also, the general practice was to afford
any party-plaintiff (a post-conviction petitioner was a civil plaintiff)
the process of a hearing before dismissing his law suit. The statutory amendment has changed that practice; most judges no longer
hold hearings or appoint counsel on subsequent petitions. Nevertheless, the trial judge has the discretionary authority to do so, and
that exercise of discretion is subject to review for abuse in the Court
of Special Appeals.'
The public defender enters a post-conviction proceeding on behalf of a first petitioner in either of two ways. 10 4 First, the Collateral
Division of the Public Defender's Office runs an inmate advisory service designed to inform prisoners of their post-conviction remedies.
The Division distributes literature to inmates through the intake
unit at the penitentiary, while the lawyers in the Division provide
legal advice on initiating a post-conviction proceeding to inmates
who request it. If an inmate requests advice or assistance, the lawyer assigned to the case will gather the relevant records and transcripts to determine whether the prisoner has an arguable claim for
post-conviction relief. If so, the lawyer will file a post-conviction petition on behalf of the prisoner. If the lawyer does not believe a

101. 1983 Md. Laws ch. 234, § I (adding a new § 645A(f)).
102. Id.
103. Crum v. State, 58 Md. App. 303, 306, 473 A.2d 67, 69, cert. denied, 300 Md. 483,
479 A.2d 372 (1984).
104. Retained counsel may also represent a petitioner, but that occurs only rarely.
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meritorious claim exists the prisoner is informed of the right to file a
pro se petition without the assistance of the Division's lawyers.
The public defender may also enter a post-conviction proceeding upon appointment by the court. The court will appoint the public defender to represent a pro se petitioner if the petitioner claims
indigence. One of the lawyers in the Collateral Division then enters
the case on the petitioner's behalf. The lawyer does whatever additional investigation is appropriate and, if necessary, amends the pro
se petition to state more clearly or fully the petitioner's allegations of
error. More than half of the first petitions filed in court reach a
public defender through court appointment.
The public defender plays a central role in the trial and disposition of first petitions. The attorney assumes responsibility for gathering the relevant records and transcripts, investigating the
petitioner's factual allegations, amending the petition in appropriate
cases, and doing everything necessary to insure the intelligible presentation of the petitioner's claims. At the hearing the petitioner's
attorney normally presents the case through the testimony of the
petitioner and through legal argument, supplemented by a legal
memorandum if requested by the court. The public defender's input greatly assists the court because it enables the judge quickly to
understand the factual and legal bases for the relief claimed by the
petitioner. The state's attorney's role, on the other hand, tends to
be more modest and reactive. If the petition appears meritless, very
little action may be taken. If the allegations of error are potentially
meritorious, considerable effort is devoted to preparing a responsive case.
The Maryland Rules require the judge to dispose of all postconviction petitions by memorandum and order.'" 5 The judge must
either dictate into the record or prepare a statement reciting each
ground alleged in the petition, the federal or state rights involved,
the court's ruling with respect to each ground, and the reasons for
any action taken. The accompanying order shall either grant or
deny relief. The losing party may then seek leave to appeal from the
Court of Special Appeals."0 6 The public defender will represent an
aggrieved petitioner on appeal only if the petitioner has an arguable
basis for the appeal. The Public Defender's Office rarely finds that
to be the case.
In most cases, therefore, the aggrieved petitioner must proceed
105. MD. R. 4-407.
106. MD. R. 1093b.
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pro se on appeal. A substantial number does so because the appeal
process is easy and cost-free and is a prerequisite to seeking federal
relief.' 7 The application for leave to appeal need only contain a
brief statement of the reasons why the Court of Special Appeals
should reverse the judgment below. The record on appeal contains
only the original petition, the state's attorney's response, any subsequent papers filed in the proceeding, and the trial court's memorandum and order. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Court of
Special Appeals denies leave to appeal in an unpublished opinion
that merely states that the court has
considered, read and denied the
8
application for leave to appeal. 10
The trial judge's memorandum and order is thus the only reasoned decision written in most post-conviction cases. Not only does
the Court of Special Appeals normally uphold the trial judge without a written opinion, but the federal courts must treat the state trial
judge's factual findings as presumptively correct if the state prisoner
subsequently seeks federal habeas corpus.'1 9 Lawyers in the Attorney General's Office have had considerable success using decisions
written by state post-conviction judges to limit or bar federal review
of prisoner claims. The availability of state post-conviction relief
not only helps the state's case in federal court; it also lessens the
habeas corpus workload of the federal judges who are able to rule
on the state record, without a hearing. This is possible only because
a state post-conviction court has made findings of fact on the preliminary matters of waiver and res judicata and on any issues resolved on the merits.
3. The Problem of Subsequent Petitions.-The workload imposed
on state post-conviction judges is in some respects more onerous
for subsequent petitions than for first petitions because the judge
does not have counsel to assist him in understanding the petitioner's claims. Of course, the judge has the authority to hold a
hearing and appoint counsel, but is often reluctant to expend public
funds and court time on a repeat performance which will most likely
prove meritless. The judge therefore has the job of deciphering the
petition. While some prisoners are quite coherent and even eloquent, most are not; and post-conviction petitions tend to become
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982).
108. In fiscal 1984, the Court of Special Appeals granted 14 and denied 193 leaves to
appeal. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND JUDICIARY 1983-84: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 36 (1984).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).
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more lengthy and incoherent as the petitioner becomes more frustrated by the earlier lack of success. The judge must nevertheless
identify the grounds raised by the petitioner and assemble all the
court files and records from prior proceedings to ascertain whether
the petitioner has waived or finally litigated those grounds. Judges
find this task frustrating and time consuming. Not only must the old
court files be assembled and reviewed, but the memorandum denying the subsequent petition must recite the procedural history of the
petitioner's prior filings and any court action previously taken. The
more petitions a prisoner files, the longer become the written decisions required to deny them.
A single prisoner's prior filings may also have spawned rulings
from a number of different judges, making it difficult for a judge to
determine what each prior judge has done. The Circuit Court of
Baltimore City has adopted a sensible response to this problem.
The clerk's office assigns subsequent post-conviction petitions to
the judge who ruled on the petitioner's first petition. 1o This system
of assigning a petitioner to the first post-conviction judge reviewing
the case avoids duplicative judicial effort. In Prince George's
County, on the other hand, a single judge has acted to avoid duplicative effort by having all subsequent post-conviction petitions assigned to her."' In other counties, the clerk's office assigns
subsequent petitions in a regular rotation, or the administrative
judge or the monthly chambers judge decides whether to deny such
petitions summarily or to assign them in the regular rotation for a
hearing. As a result, in most counties the judge assigned the subsequent post-conviction petition is rarely the judge who heard the first
petition. Perhaps a prisoner should have access to a new judge on
post-conviction (i.e., ajudge different from the trial judge), but sampling several different post-conviction judges should not be
permitted.
Subsequent petitions are more of a nuisance than a genuine
problem. Judges can handle them without any danger that a judicial
default will spring a guilty person from prison. Although a judge
will not often hold a hearing and appoint counsel on a subsequent
petition, such action is possible if the judge really wants to understand what the prisoner is trying to say. Judges in Baltimore and
Montgomery Counties have often done just that. In those counties
110. Interview with the Honorable David Ross, Associate Judge, Maryland Circuit
Court for the Eighth Judicial Circuit (May 1985).
111. Interview with the Honorable Audrey E. Melbourne, Associate Judge, Maryland
Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit (May 1985).
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all post-conviction petitions go either to the administrative or the
chambers judge who decides whether to dismiss them summarily or
assign them for a hearing before another judge." 2 Doubtful or unclear cases go to a hearing, as most chambers judges do not have the
time or incentive fully to investigate all petitions to see if a hearing
is necessary. In Baltimore City, on the other hand, the judge assigned a subsequent post-conviction petition has already heard the
petitioner once and rarely finds it necessary to do so again. Thus,
the problem of successive petitions is a manageable one, especially
given the limited number of subsequent filings. One must still inquire, however, whether the judicial effort is worthwhile given the
lack of merit in most subsequent petitions.
B.

The Scope of the Remedy

As indicated previously, the scope of the issues that can be
raised on post-conviction is quite broad. The petitioner may raise
all constitutional or legal issues affecting the validity of the conviction. The post-conviction court may not, however, grant relief on
an allegation of error if the petitioner has finally litigated or waived
the error.' 13 As a practical matter, this requirement bars the petitioner from obtaining relief for most trial errors. If the petitioner
raised the alleged error at trial and pursued it on appeal, it is most
likely that the allegation has been finally litigated. If the petitioner
did not raise the alleged error at trial, or raised it but did not pursue
it on appeal, the error has most likely been waived. The petitioner
loses in either case.
The doctrine of waiver is particularly effective in barring allegations of trial error. If the allegation does not involve the loss of a
fundamental right,'
the post-conviction court will almost certainly
treat counsel's failure to present the allegation to the trial or appellate court as a procedural default (i.e., a waiver by operation of
law)." 5 If the alleged error does involve a fundamental right, the
trial transcript will contain a record of the defendant's knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right if the trial court complied with appli112. Interview with the Honorable John F. Fader, II, Associate Judge, Maryland Circuit Court for the Third Circuit (Baltimore County) (June 1985); Interview with the
Honorable David L. Cahoon, Associate Judge, Maryland Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit (Montgomery County) (June 1985).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
114. Fundamental rights include: right to counsel, to confront one's accusers, to
plead not guilty, to a jury trial, and to claim the privilege against self-incrimination. See
supra note 76.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
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cable court rules and judicial decisions prescribing the procedure to
follow when the defendant does not have counsel,"16 when the defendant's disruptive behavior requires exclusion from the trial," 7 or
when the defendant desires to plead guilty," 8 obtain a bench
trial," 9 or take the stand.' 20 While the trial record is not conclusive
on the issue of the defendant's waiver, 1 2 ' post-conviction petitioners are not likely to win many such cases. Absent some evidence
explaining why the petitioner lied at trial, the post-conviction court
will normally believe the petitioner's trial testimony rather than any
testimony first offered at the post-conviction hearing.
The petitioner is more likely to obtain a determination on the
merits if the trial record does not fully disclose the error alleged.
The prime example is the defendant's right to the effective assistance of trial counsel-a fundamental right subject to the knowing
and intelligent waiver standard.' 22 The Court of Appeals has consistently refused to resolve, on direct appeal, claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In the court's view, the trial court record does
not provide an adequate basis for resolving the claim. This is true
even in cases in which the defendant objected to trial counsel's effectiveness at trial or on a motion for a new trial. The court has
reasoned that trial counsel should have the opportunity to present
testimony challenging the allegation of ineffectiveness. 123 While it
is possible for an appellate court, on direct review, to order a remand to expand the record, 24 the Court of Appeals has in most
situations strongly disfavored such piecemeal appeals. Normally,
the Court of Appeals instructs defendants to raise those issues not

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See MD.
See MD.
See MD.
See MD.
State v.

R. 4-215(b) (Waiver of Counsel).
R. 4-231(c) (Waiver of Right to be Present).
R. 4-242 (Pleas).
R. 4-246 (Waiver of Jury Trial).
McKenzie, 17 Md. App. 563, 582, 303 A.2d 406, 417 (1973); Stevens v.

State, 232 Md. 33, 38-39, 192 A.2d 73, 76 (1963).
121. The defendant, for example, may allege on post-conviction that a guilty plea or
jury trial waiver was the result of undisclosed prosecutorial threats to seek the maximum
penalty if the defendant did not forego the right. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.

63, 76-79 (1977) (record of defendant's guilty plea not binding on federal habeas
corpus).
122. Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 150-51, 395 A.2d 464, 474-75 (1978).
123. Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 434-35, 439 A.2d 542, 558-59 (1982).
124. Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425, 437-38, 430 A.2d 588, 595-96 (1981) (remand to
determine whether prosecutorial intrusion into Public Defender's Office violated the defendant's right to counsel); see also Warrick v. State, 302 Md. 162, 174, 486 A.2d 189, 195
(1984) (remand to ascertain whether state's attorney failed to disclose discoverable
material).
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adequately raised by the trial record in a post-conviction petition., 2 5
Post-conviction courts must therefore resolve on the merits
most ineffectiveness of counsel allegations. Since the claim is a constitutional one, it may be raised on post-conviction. In addition, it is
not normally possible for the defendant to finally litigate or waive
the claim at trial. Only in the rarest of cases is the defendant even
able to obtain a ruling on the allegation prior to instituting post26
conviction proceedings.

1

Another category of allegations that post-conviction courts usually resolve on the merits is allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.' 27 An appellate court is unlikely to hear such an allegation on
direct review unless the misconduct occurred on the record. If the
alleged misconduct involved the suppression of evidence,
prosecutorial vindictiveness, or other extra-record activity, the petitioner could not have waived or finally litigated it at trial or on appeal. Post-conviction is the only form available for raising it.
The Court of Appeals' refusal to decide these issues on direct
review has resulted in an expansion of the post-conviction court's
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals has in effect invoked the availability of post-conviction relief as a justification for its refusal to increase the appellate workload. Accordingly, the court has refused to
hear on direct review allegations that the defendant had not knowingly and intelligently waived the right to jury trial. 128 Similarly, the
court has refused review of an allegation that the trial judge had
1 29
denied defendant's counsel the right to make closing argument.
In both cases, the court rejected the option of piecemeal appeals
(i.e., a remand for the necessary factual development followed by
125. See Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 112-13,472 A.2d 953, 965-66 (1983) (ineffective
assistance of counsel); Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 544-46, 386 A.2d 336, 338
(1978) (denial of right to final argument); State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11,25, 273 A.2d
156, 163-64 (1971) (waiver of right to jury trial).
126. In White v. State, 17 Md. App. 58, 64-67, 299 A.2d 873, 876-77 (1975), the court,
on direct appeal, ruled on the effectiveness of defendant's trial counsel. Defendant and
his counsel had both testified on the matter on the defendant's motion for a new trial

after the judge had warned the defendant that his raising the issue in this fashion would
probably bar him from raising it on post-conviction. In Harris v. State, 299 Md. 511,
518, 474 A.2d 890, 893 (1984), the court likewise allowed a defendant to challenge the
effectiveness of his counsel in a former Rule 731 f. 1. proceeding to withdraw a guilty
plea.
127. See, e.g., Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961), aff'd 373 U.S. 83
(1963) (prosecutorial suppression of accomplice's confession admitting actual killing).
128. State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11,25, 273 A.2d 156, 163-64 (1971).
129. Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 544, 386 A.2d 336, 338 (1978). The Court of
Appeals recently reaffirmed Covington in Cherry v. State, 305 Md. 631, 506 A.2d 228
(1986).
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further proceedings in the appellate court) and ruled that post-conviction was the proper forum to raise the allegation. 3 0 On postconviction, however, the court may still find that the defendant did
in fact knowingly and intelligently waive his right to jury trial' 3 ' or
that the right to have
counsel make closing argument was lost by
32
procedural default. 1
Post-conviction in Maryland has thus developed in ways that resemble the historic writ of coram nobis. Coram nobis differed from
the ordinary writ of error in that the case remained in the trial court,
as opposed to an appellate court, to review errors of fact not apparent from the trial record.' 33 The Court of Appeals has used postconviction in a fashion similar to coram nobis by relegating issues to
post-conviction that appellate courts in other states are willing to
decide on direct review. 134 Post-conviction has therefore become
part of the review process in Maryland. Convicted defendants may
raise most issues on appeal, but some issues must await post-conviction before a convicted offender may raise them. The Court of Appeals' restrictive use of direct review would be indefensible absent
the availability of a subsequent review process-a process that generously furnishes the prisoner with both counsel and an evidentiary
hearing.
C.

Special Issues Relating to Effectiveness of Counsel

More than half of the first petitions filed under the Act allege
the ineffectiveness of petitioner's trial or appellate counsel.' 35 This
development is not unexpected since the post-conviction court will
treat most other allegations of error as finally litigated or waived.
Even if the petitioner alleges numerous other trial errors, the court
130. Covington, 282 Md. at 544-45, 386 A.2d at 338; Zimmerman, 261 Md. at 25, 273
A.2d at 163-64.
131. Zimmerman, 261 Md. at 25-26, 273 A.2d at 164.
132. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how a post-conviction court could find
that the defendant waived the right to effective assistance of trial or appellate counsel
when the defendant was not able to raise any earlier objection without discharging counsel in midtrial or midappeal, thus prejudicing the defense.
133. Bernard v. State, 193 Md. 1,4, 65 A.2d 297, 298 (1949).
134. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 100-01, 331 A.2d 435, 438 (1975)
(new counsel required to raise on direct appeal ineffectiveness of trial counsel).
135. The Public Defender's Office has asserted that at least 97 % of the pro se petitions
filed under the Act allege the ineffectivness of the petitioner's trial or appellate counsel.
Memorandum of Alan Murrell, Public Defender, to Administrative Judges of the Circuit
Court (June 7, 1984) (copy on file with the author). Few of the petitions filed by the
Public Defender's Office make a similar allegation. The pro se petitions outnumber the
petitions filed by counsel.
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will concentrate its attention on the ineffectiveness of counsel-the
one issue that the petitioner plainly has not finally litigated or
waived.
The hearing will include testimony by both the petitioner and
petitioner's former counsel. By alleging counsel's ineffectiveness,
the petitioner waives the attorney-client privilege. Normally counsel
will testify for the state to describe the adequacy of the representation afforded petitioner. Very few allegations of ineffectiveness
prove to have merit. Indeed, the standard for proving ineffectiveness is a rigorous one. The applicable test is whether defense counsel's representation was "reasonably effective," i.e., within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 6 Judicial
evaluation of counsel's performance must be "highly deferential"
and judges must avoid second guessing counsel's trial strategy.'37
Even if the post-conviction court finds that trial or appellate counsel
did err, the court may grant a new trial only if there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial or
1 38
appeal would have been different.
The prevalence of ineffectiveness claims poses a dilemma for
the public defender. In most cases, the public defender will have
represented a convicted defendant at trial and on appeal. A conflict
of interest may arise when an attorney from the Collateral Division
of the Public Defender's Office represents a prisoner challenging
the effectiveness of the assistant public defender who represented
the prisoner at trial or on appeal. The issue may surface when the
prisoner first contacts the Division's advisory service prior to filing a
petition or when the court appoints the public defender to represent
apro se petitioner. In both cases, the Collateral Division's policy is to
investigate the prisoner's allegation to determine whether there is
any support for it in the trial or appellate record. If the review indicates that the allegation of incompetence "is frivolous and/or unsupported,"'' 3 9 the Division will so advise the prisoner and decline
to file a petition alleging counsel's incompetence. However, if the
prisoner has already filed a pro se petition alleging incompetence and
the court has appointed a public defender, that attorney will con136. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Court of Appeals
adopted the Strickland tests for evaluating claims of ineffectiveness in State v. Tichnell,
306 Md. 428, 441, 509 A.2d 1179, 1186, (1986).
137. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Tichnell, 306 Md. at 456, 509 A.2d at 1193.
138. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Tichnell, 306 Md. at 441, 509 A.2d at 1186.
139. Memorandum of Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender to Administrative Judges of
the Circuit Court (June 7, 1984) (copy on file with author).
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tinue to represent the petitioner despite the seeming conflict of interest. While the assistant public defender will not "personally
argue" 14 1 the frivolous point, the petitioner will receive assistance in
presenting the allegation of counsel's ineffectiveness by counsel's
examination of both the petitioner and the petitioner's former counsel. In this fashion the public defender does assist the court in understanding what the petitioner alleges occurred at trial or on
appeal.
Only if the prisoner raises a genuine issue of effective representation or conflict of interest does the Office of Public Defender assign a post-conviction case to one of its panel attorneys. This policy
is surely a debatable one, but the problems it raises are more of
appearance than of unfairness to post-conviction petitioners. While
it is possible to assign panel attorneys every time an indigent prisoner alleges ineffectiveness of counsel, such a policy would in effect
deprive the Collateral Division of most of its business. The strength
of that Division lies in the fact that six or seven experienced attorneys handle the bulk of the state's post-conviction defense work.
The likelihood that dozens of panel attorneys could do the same job
as efficiently or as ably is small. There is also little evidence that
Collateral Division attorneys are reluctant to question the competence of the public defender who represented the petitioner at the
trial or appellate stages. The Public Defender's Office is a large one.
The Division attorneys do not work closely with the office's trial and
appellate attorneys, many of whom they do not even know.
The public defender's representation of a post-conviction petitioner nevertheless does communicate to the court that the attorney
does not believe that the petitioner's allegation of the prior public
defender's ineffectiveness has merit. However, it is doubtful that
implicit communication prejudices the petitioner. Most post-conviction judges treat an ineffectiveness allegation as a matter they
must resolve at the hearing and appreciate the help of the public
defender in presenting the petitioner's contentions as clearly as possible. The petitioner has no basis for objecting to this procedure
because there is no federal or state constitutional right to counsel at
a post-conviction proceeding.' 4 ' Furthermore, a prisoner's statu140. Id.
141. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 829-32 (1977) (federal constitution). The
Court of Appeals has followed federal authority in determining the scope of the state
constitutional right to counsel. Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 357-62, 464
A.2d 228, 234-36 (1983); Utt v. State, 293 Md. 271, 274-86, 443 A.2d 582, 583-89

(1982).
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tory right to free counsel on post-conviction
is a right to representa14 2
tion by the public defender.
A more serious conflict of interest perceived by some is the lack
of zealousness displayed by some public defenders in defending,
when called as a witness on post-conviction, their own earlier representation of a petitioner. Public defenders do not always have the
same stake in defending their professional reputations as do private
practitioners. A public defender may be tempted to concede an error too readily when that concession rebounds to the benefit of a
former client, or possibly even saves the client's life in a capital case.
Once again, while the potential for conflict is present, the integrity
of most lawyers permits the system to function fairly.
D.

The Merits of Maryland's Post-Conviction Process

In sum, Maryland has a generous system of post-conviction relief. Despite its generosity, the system functions reasonably effectively. Each prisoner receives as of right one post-conviction
hearing before a judge different from the judge who tried the case.
At the hearing, the petitioner receives free legal assistance from the
Public Defender's Office and may present evidence in support of the
alleged errors. There are no filing fees, verification requirements,
or assessment of costs against unsuccessful petitioners. The only
place where the state is less forthcoming in furnishing a postconviction remedy is when it assigns, for reasons of efficiency, legal
representation of indigent petitioners to the Public Defender's Office despite that Office's potential conflict of interest.
By contrast, the most recent Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,' 4 3 derived in large part from the ABA Standards for PostConviction Remedies, 144 favors the summary disposition of peti145
tions, including first petitions, without an evidentiary hearing.
The Uniform Act establishes formal pleading requirements, permits
discovery, and authorizes the grant of summary judgment if no ma142. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 4(b)(3) (1983).
143. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a new Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act in 1980. UNIF. POST-CONVICTION

PROC. ACT, 11U.L.A. 204-13 (Supp. 1986). The Commissioners had revised the first
(1955) Uniform Act in 1966. II U.L.A. 485-540 (1974).
144. UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROC. ACT, 11 U.L.A. 204 (Supp. 1986) (Prefatory
Note).
145. See IV ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22.47 to 22.49 (Supp. 1986) (commentary to Standard 22-4.5 of Standards on Post-Conviction Remedies). Sections 8 and
9 of the Uniform Act purport to implement that Standard. See 11 U.L.A. 209 (Supp.
1986).
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terial fact is in dispute or if the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. 1 46 The purpose of these provisions is to reduce
the burden of post-conviction relief by avoiding unnecessary evidentiary hearings. 4 7 The Uniform Act even permits the judge who
tried the case to rule on post-conviction applications. 48 The new
Act also seeks to deter frivolous applications by allowing the assessment of costs against an applicant, if a court finds "that the applicant's claim is so completely lacking in factual support or legal basis
as to be frivolous or that the applicant has deliberately misused
process." 149
Other states are also less generous in affording post-conviction
process. It does not appear that any state other than Maryland mandates a hearing with free counsel on all first petitions. Pennsylvania
permits the summary disposition of claims that are "patently frivolous" and "without a trace of support either in the record or from
other evidence submitted by the petitioner."' 5 0 Ohio is still more
demanding. To obtain a hearing on trial counsel's ineffectiveness,
the petitioner must submit "evidentiary documents containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate the lack of competent counsel
and also that the defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness."''
Some states do not even follow the recommendations of
the ABA Post-Conviction Standards and the Uniform Act in requiring that the post-conviction court appoint counsel for indigent petitioners so that counsel may amend the pleadings, submit
documentary evidence, or do whatever else is necessary to obtain an
evidentiary hearing.' 5 2 Missouri, however, has found it desir -Jle to
change its practice and now provides counsel to assist petitioners in
presenting their claims. Reacting to the burden imposed on the
courts by pro se petitions, the Missouri Supreme Court amended its
rules to provide for the appointment of counsel from the Public Defender's Office to represent all indigent petitioners at the trial court
146. See UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROC. ACT at § 4 (application to refer to portion of
the record of prior proceedings pertinent to alleged grounds for relief); § 6 (response by
answer or motion); § 8 (discovery); and § 9 (summary disposition).
147. See supra note 144.
148. UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROC. ACT at § 3(g).

149. Id. at § 13. See also IV ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22-3.5(b) (Supp.
1986) (invocation of post-conviction court's jurisdiction should not be "without risk that
a financial obligation may be imposed.").
150. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9549(b) (Purdon 1982).

151. State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St. 2d 107, Ill, 413 N.E.2d 819, 822 (1980) (interpreting
Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21(c) and (e)) (emphasis in original).
152. See, e.g., Alexander, Post-Conviction Relief in Tennessee, 48 TENN. L. REV. 605, 63742 (1981).
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level. 153 Missouri thus follows the ABA Standards and the Uniform
5 4
Act in not limiting the appointment of counsel to first petitioners. 1
The experience of other states might be useful if Maryland's
system of post-conviction relief were functioning unsatisfactorily.
That does not appear to be the case. The system is generous to the
prisoner and manageable for the state. Whatever time and expense
other states save by avoiding evidentiary hearings seem to be lost
through additional appellate litigation. For example, between
March 1, 1966, and September 21, 1981, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decided by published opinion more than 300 post-conviction
appeals. That figure included only appeals in murder cases because
all other post-conviction appeals went to an intermediate appellate
court. 15 5 A similar explosion of appellate litigation in Missouri convinced the Supreme Court in that state to appoint counsel to represent all petitioners at the trial level in order to reduce the burden of
appeals from the the trial courts' summary dismissal of pro se
56
petitions.'
This brief survey of the experience of other states demonstrates
that Maryland's system of post-conviction relief shines by comparison. The strength of the Maryland system is the mandatory hearing
with counsel on the first petition. That approach does utilize considerable public resources, but the system allocates those resources
to the right court (the convicting court) and, normally, at the right
time (shortly after the completion of direct review). No doubt trial
judges conduct many hearings that after the fact appear unnecessary. The hearing, nevertheless, has become part of the review process. The petitioner may raise allegations that cannot be raised on
appeal and may present them to a new judge. For many prisoners, it
is their first time in court since the day of their sentencing. To afford a petitioner one more hearing before a new judge is not an
excessive demand to place on the courts when the prisoner may face
many years or even life in custody. No doubt the allegation most

153. See Comment, Postconviction Remedies under Missouri Rule 27.26: Problems and Solutions, 47 Mo. L. REV. 787 (1982).
154. IV ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE 22-4.5 (Supp. 1986); UNIF. POsT-CoNVICTION PROC. ACT at § 5. Both the Standards and the Act seek to achieve efficiencies
through the summary disposition of all petitions.
155. See Comment, Repetitive Post-Conviction Petitions Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Can the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Tame the "Monster"? 20 DuQ. L. REV. 237, 239
(1982).
156. Comment, Postconviction Remedies under Missouri Rule 27.26: Problems and Solutions,
47 Mo. L. REV. 787, 790 (1982). The appellate courts had evidently found it impossible
to dispose of such appeals without the aid of counsel. Id.
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frequently litigated by prisoners, the ineffectiveness of trial or appellate counsel, is normally meritless; but it is meritless in part because trial and appellate counsel know that a post-conviction court
may scrutinize their performance. Such allegations are likely to involve factual disputes, and any effort to avoid evidentiary hearings
to unravel the facts is simply not worth the effort.
IV.

DISCUSSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 1 THROUGH

6

Maryland's present system of post-conviction relief functions
reasonably well. Nevertheless, the case for reform is a strong one.
The state's system of post-conviction relief should be as efficient as
possible. The allocation of excessive resources to collateral challenges wastes valuable time and effort needed elsewhere in the criminal justice system. Nothing is more pernicious to those prisoners
who have valid claims than the increasingly pervasive view that the
whole system of post-conviction remedies is a "gigantic waste" of
public resources.' 5 7 If that view prevails, judges will not devote the
necessary attention to collateral challenges and legislators will be
tempted to abolish the whole system. The better approach, therefore, is to reform the present system to reduce inefficiencies while
still assuring that prisoners with valid claims will receive a full and
fair opportunity to present them.
The present system should therefore be modified to take better
advantage of the full hearing with counsel granted to first petitioners. That process affords a basis for sharply limiting subsequent collateral challenges. Not only does the petitioner receive from the
trial court a reasoned decision concerning the alleged errors, but
also leave to appeal an adverse decision to the Court of Special Appeals. Further, for allegations of error based on federal law, a writ
of habeas corpus may be sought in the federal courts. After the prisoner has exhausted those remedies, further relief should not be afforded absent exceptional circumstances. Post-conviction review
should be a one-shot venture. Courts should be able to resolve subsequent collateral challenges with a minimum of effort, regardless of
whether the prisoner labels them petitions for post-conviction relief
or applications for writs of habeas corpus or coram nobis.
The following six recommendations seek to accomplish these
objectives. The text which follows presents each recommendation
157. The phrase is Judge Friendly's from his oft-cited article attacking the excesses of
most systems for post-conviction relief. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack
on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 148 (1970).
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in general terms. Appendix A contains precise statutory language
to implement similar recommendations approved by the Judicial
Conference Committee.
Recommendation 1: Limiting Convicted Offenders to One Post-Conviction Petition. The legislature should amend the Post Conviction Procedure Act to reinstate the single petition rule found in the original
Act of 1958. The Act should permit each prisoner only one petition
to challenge all convictions and sentences resulting from a single
criminal trial. The amended Act should expressly advise the prisoner to raise all available allegations of error in the petition. The
legislature was in effect too generous in 1986 when it granted prisoners an unrestricted opportunity to file a second petition. Rather,
it should define, as suggested below, the limited instances in which a
prisoner should receive a further hearing on the first (and only)
petition.
The single petition rule is a fair accommodation of a prisoner's
and the state's interest if the prisoner receives, as is the case in
Maryland, the assistance of counsel and a hearing on the petition.
The petitioner's attorney has the responsibility to ascertain what allegations of error the petitioner wishes to raise and to review the
record for other possible claims. Under the present law of waiver,
all available allegations of error must be raised in the first petition.
A statutory single petition rule does no more than reiterate that requirement. If attorneys do their job properly, one wonders what
errors they might miss that a petitioner should be allowed to raise at
a later time.
Two categories ofjustifiably missed errors come to mind. First,
counsel "missed" the error because the basis for the allegation was
a rule of law announced by the United States Supreme Court or the
Maryland Court of Appeals subsequent to the post-conviction proceeding. If the new law applies retroactively, then the prisoner
should be able to raise the allegation of error notwithstanding a previous unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief. For example,
in Hankerson v. North Carolina15 8 the Supreme Court gave full retroactive effect to its earlier holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur' 5 9 invalidating jury instructions that relieved the prosecution of proving all
elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A prisoner
should be able to pursue an allegation of error based on Mullaney,
even though he did not raise that allegation in a pre-Mullaney post158. 432 U.S. 233, 240 (1977).
159. 421 U.S. 684, 701-02 (1975).
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conviction proceeding. 60
A second possibility is that the lawyer "missed" the error because neither the attorney nor the petitioner was aware of its factual
basis at the time of the first petition, nor could they have discovered
the facts with due diligence. In that case, the prisoner should be
able to raise the allegation subsequently. For example, the factual
basis for an allegation that the state suppressed exculpatory evidence may not have been reasonably discoverable by the petitioner
when pursuing the first post-conviction petition. The petitioner
should therefore be able to raise that allegation when the relevant
facts become known, at least if the petitioner pursued the matter
diligently. One must acknowledge, however, that this exception to
the single petition rule may prove difficult to contain. While postconviction courts should have little difficulty ascertaining whether
there is new law,"' inquiries into allegations of new facts can be
62
complicated and may require protracted hearings.
In these two exceptional situations it makes more sense to permit the prisoner to reopen the prior proceeding rather than to file a
new petition. Categorizing the matter as a reopening should result
in bringing the petitioner before the judge who handled the petitioner's initial filing. In addition to being more familiar with the
case, that judge seems better equipped than a new judge to determine the one remaining permissible basis for reopening an initial
post-conviction proceeding: the ineffectiveness of petitioner's postconviction counsel.
There is no federal or state constitutional right to appointed
counsel on post-conviction.' 6 The indigent prisoner receives free
counsel as a matter of legislative grace. Therefore a prisoner has
160. In Hankerson, the Court did make the startling suggestion that a state could insulate past convictions from retrospective changes in the law by enforcing on post-conviction its contemporaneous objection rule to find a waiver. 432 U.S. at 244 n. 8. The
Court seemingly withdrew the suggestion in Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9-20 (1984) (failure to raise an objection based on a novel legal theory does not operate as a waiver).
161. The Maryland Court of Appeals has been most reluctant to admit that its path
breaking decisions really constitute "new law," thus excusing a defendant's previous
failure to raise an allegation of error. SeeJones v. State, 297 Md. 7, 24-25, 464 A.2d 977,
985-86 (1983) (defendant's access to grand jury testimony of prosecution witness not
new law); Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 30,400 A.2d 406, 411 (1978) (prosecution's burden
to negate alibi defense beyond reasonable doubt not new law).
162. For this reason the Judicial Conference Committee rejected the "new facts" exception to the single petition rule. See statutory language implementing recommendation 1 in Appendix A (proposed § 645A(g)). For a similar hostility to claims based on
new facts, see MD. R. 4-331 (c) (motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence
must be filed within one year).
163. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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not suffered a constitutional violation if the state does not provide
effective counsel on post-conviction. At most, the ineffectiveness of
counsel affects the application of the doctrines of res judicata and
waiver to subsequent collateral challenges.
Whether post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness by itself is a
sufficient basis for permitting the post-conviction petitioner to circumvent res judicata or waiver bars is not clear. Nevertheless, it appears desirable to avoid that question by affording the petitioner a
new post-conviction proceeding if post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness can be demonstrated. Once again the mechanism available
to the petitioner should be the filing of a motion to reopen the original proceeding. Thus, the preclusive effect of the single petition
rule applies only if the petitioner received the effective assistance of
counsel. If the judge determines that post-conviction counsel was
ineffective, the petitioner, assisted by new counsel, may further litigate those allegations of error previously raised and raise any new
allegations.
The determination of post-conviction counsel's effectiveness
should not prove to be a difficult task in most cases. The judge who
must make that determination will normally have presided at the initial post-conviction hearing and observed counsel's performance.
What constitutes effective representation on post-conviction is also
relatively clear-cut. First of all, counsel should investigate the petitioner's allegations by reviewing the relevant records and transcripts
and by interviewing prior counsel and other possible witnesses.
Counsel should also determine from the same sources whether
there are any other tenable allegations of error. The allegations
that the petitioner wishes to raise and any potential allegations uncovered by counsel should then be reviewed with the petitioner. Finally, counsel should put the petitioner and any other available
witnesses on the stand to testify in support of the allegations. If
counsel does not do these things, there is a basis for a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel and the judge should reopen the
post-conviction proceeding. The Strickland 14 "prejudice" standard
for winning a new trial or sentencing hearing seems out of place
here, given the limited relief (a reopening) sought by the petitioner.
In addition, in most cases the adequacy of post-conviction counsel's
representation will be readily apparent. An affidavit reviewing
counsel's performance should permit the court to deny most mo164. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) ("The defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.").
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tions to reopen without a hearing or the appointment of new
counsel.
Under the proposed single petition rule a petitioner may thus
seek to reopen a post-conviction proceeding on the basis of new
law, new evidence, or ineffective counsel. Whether the petitioner
should be able to seek leave to appeal from the denial of a petition
to reopen is a difficult question. TheJudicial Conference's proposal
does not permit the petitioner to do so and limits him to one appeal
(i.e., an appeal from the denial of the original petition).' 6 5 That approach seems preferable to permitting multiple appeals. One possible alternative would be to permit a petitioner to move to reopen
the proceeding for ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel before
seeking leave to appeal. The petitioner's single appeal could then
include the allegation of counsel's ineffectiveness.
The single petition rule poses one further problem. What
about those fundamental rights that require a knowing and intelligent waiver? How can one bar a prisoner from raising a violation of
a fundamental right at a later time merely because such an allegation was not included in a post-conviction petition? The answer to
this question is twofold.
First, the knowing and intelligent waiver standard appropriately
applies only at trial. At trial, a defendant may choose not to exercise
certain fundamental rights that are then available. A defendant
does so by proceeding without counsel, pleading guilty, electing a
bench trial, taking the stand, or refusing to be present during the
proceeding. Case law requires that a decision not to exercise a fundamental right must be a knowing and intelligent one. If the defendant's foregoing of the right at trial is not a knowing and
intelligent choice, that violation is an allegation of error that the defendant may subsequently raise on post-conviction. The single petition rule makes no change in that basic rule. Going one step further
and requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver on post-conviction in
order to bar the prisoner from raising an allegation in a subsequent
collateral proceeding makes little sense. The federal constitution
does not require such a result.' 6 6 If the petitioner had competent
counsel, there should be no problem enforcing the petitioner's
67
waiver of all allegations of error includable in a single petition.
What the petitioner really loses by not including an allegation is the
165. See recommendation 1 in Appendix A (last sentence of proposed § 645A(g)).
166. SeeJones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.
Jones v. McKaskle, 466 U.S. 976 (1984).
167. For this variety of waiver, see supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
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right to obtain post-conviction relief on the basis of that error. It is
doubtful whether that right, unlike the fundamental right itself, is of
68
constitutional dimension. 1
Second, representation by competent counsel is an adequate
guarantee that petitioner's waiver satisfies the more rigorous standard of a knowing and intelligent waiver. A second or subsequent
post-conviction petition alleging that the petitioner's real grievance
was the lack of a jury trial, ineffective trial counsel, or a coerced
guilty plea is an absurdity. Either the fundamental right at stake did
not mean much to the petitioner, as evidenced by the long delay in
raising it, or petitioner's post-conviction counsel was asleep on the
job. It therefore seems permissible to presume conclusively that a
petitioner represented by competent counsel waives an allegation of
error based on an earlier loss of a fundamental right if the allegation
is not raised in the first post-conviction petition."'
The Court of Appeals' holding in Curtis v. State 170 is not inconsistent with this analysis. Curtis held that a petitioner could allege
trial counsel's ineffectiveness in a subsequent post-conviction petition, if the petitioner had not knowingly and intelligently waived
that allegation by failing to raise it in an earlier post-conviction petition. That holding is one of statutory interpretation. The court first
held that the legislature intended that the knowing and intelligent
waiver standard in section 645A(c) apply only to the loss of fundamental rights. The court then characterized the effectiveness of trial
counsel as a fundamental right. Once the court had reached that
point in its analysis, section 645A(c) mandated the result reached by
the court. The statute plainly provided that Curtis could raise in a
subsequent petition the ineffectiveness of trial counsel unless he had
"knowingly and intelligently" waived the allegation at trial, on appeal, or "in a prior proceeding under this subtitle." Thus, Curtis
held: "Consequently, subsection (c) of the Post Conviction Procedure Act is applicable to Curtis' contention, and it can only be
deemed 'waived' for purpose of the Post Conviction Act if Curtis
'intelligently and knowingly' failed to raise it previously.' 7' There168. In other words, it is doubtful whether the constitutional bar against the suspension of the writ, see supra note 5, prevents the courts or the legislature from narrowing
the scope of the writ to cover only jurisdictional errors. For the twentieth century expansion of the writ, see supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
169. Jones, 722 F.2d at 164. See also Daniels v. Blackburn, 763 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985);
Booker v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1371 (11th Cir. 1985).
170. 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978).
171. Id. at 150-51, 395 A.2d at 475.
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fore, recommendation 1 does not overrule Curtis; it merely removes
the statutory basis for its holding.
Recommendation 2: Elimination of Duplicative Habeas Corpus Applications. The thrust of these recommendations is to funnel into a single
post-conviction proceeding whatever grounds a prisoner has to
challenge a conviction collaterally. If the prisoner receives a full
and fair opportunity in that proceeding to litigate any allegations of
error, then it is proper for the legislature sharply to curtail any subsequent collateral challenges. A different problem arises if the prisoner's collateral attack by habeas corpus precedes the post-conviction
hearing. Under present law, the judge who receives an application
for a writ of habeas corpus may treat it as a post-conviction petition
only with the consent of the petitioner.1 7 2 The legislature should
eliminate the requirement of the applicant's consent and authorize
the judge to transfer an application to the convicting court for disposition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act if two conditions
are met. First, the applicant must be seeking relief available under
the Post Conviction Procedure Act. Second, the applicant must not
have previously filed a post-conviction petition. If the habeas judge
transfers the application upon finding these two requirements satisfied, the convicting court must rule on the application as a postconviction petition, subject, of course, to the petitioner's right to
amend or withdraw it.

This change benefits both the state and the prisoner. The state
avoids the burden of duplicative remedies, habeas corpus and then
post-conviction relief, while the prisoner avoids the potential trap of
habeas corpus. On habeas corpus, the prisoner has no right to counsel, a hearing, or an appeal. Yet under present law, 1 73 the adverse
decision by a single habeas judge is res judicata in any subsequent
post-conviction proceeding. This preclusion provision is so questionable that the Attorney General's Office does not customarily in1
voke it. 74
The proposal does not constitute a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in violation of the state constitution. The transfer is
discretionary and limited to cases in which the relief sought is available under the Post Conviction Procedure Act. The amended statute should prohibit the transfer if the habeas judge finds that "the
post-conviction remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legal172. MD. R. Z55.

173.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(b) (1982).
174. See supra note 83.
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ity of the petitioner's detention."'' 75 For example, if the habeas
judge believes that the greater speed associated with habeas proceedings is necessary to afford the prisoner an adequate and effective opportunity to test the legality of the detention, then the judge
should rule on the habeas corpus application rather than transfer it
to the sentencing court for processing under the Post Conviction
Procedure Act. This safeguard prevents any suspension of the
writ.176

Recommendation 3: Elimination of Duplicative Coram Nobis Applications. Coram nobis has largely disappeared as a post-conviction
remedy. There are no statutes or court rules governing its use. The
77
statutory post-conviction remedy is in fact a coram nobis remedy.1
Arguably, the new statutory remedy supersedes the common-law
writ because the writ is only available in the absence of any other
78

statutory proceeding. 1

The one situation in which coram nobis plainly survives is when
the convicted offender is no longer incarcerated or on parole or
probation. The convicted offender has no remedy in this situation
under the Post Conviction Procedure Act or on habeas corpus, because both those remedies are available only to offenders in custody. Coram nobis may be important to the offender facing
recidivist penalties on a new charge. A recidivism proceeding offers
only limited opportunities to challenge the validity of a prior conviction.' 79 It may therefore be precipitous to abolish completely coram
nobis. The legislature should therefore preserve the writ in situations where the defendant challenging a conviction is not in custody
and therefore cannot seek relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act.
Recommendation 4: Limitations on Subsequent Habeas Corpus Applications. If the legislature readopts the single petition rule, a prisoner
should not be able to circumvent that limitation through subsequent
habeas corpus applications. At the same time, habeas corpus is a
constitutionally protected remedy that the legislature must preserve. To accommodate those two interests, the legislature, while
leaving the habeas judge's authority to do justice untouched, should
175. See Appendix A, recommendation 2.

176. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 204, 223 (1952), discussed supra at note 33.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
178. Bernard v. State, 193 Md. 1,4, 65 A.2d 297, 298 (1949).
179. MD. R. 4-245 does not afford the alleged subsequent offender any opportunity to
do so, but the sentencing court must nevertheless allow the offender to challenge prior
convictions that were obtained without the aid of counsel. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.
109, 114-15 (1967).
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authorize the judge to refuse issuance of the writ for alleged errors
that the applicant raised or could have raised in a prior postconviction proceeding. The habeas judge need not, and normally
should not, conduct a second post-conviction proceeding. If the
judge believes it more efficient for the convicting court to rule on
the application, the transfer of the application to that court should
follow. Section 3-702(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article already authorizes a transfer of the application to any court in
the judicial circuit where the conviction took place. It seems sensible to be more specific and require by statute or court rule a transfer
to the prior post-conviction court.
The residual authority of the habeas judge to do justice derives
from the history and function of the writ. The doctrines of res judicata and waiver have never barred a judge from hearing allegations
previously raised by the applicant or from hearing new allegations. 10 Before denying the writ, the judge must inquire into the
cause of the applicant's confinement and determine that the confinement is legal. Any deference given to the denial of relief by the
post-conviction court is necessarily a matter of discretion. Imposing
the doctrines of res judicata and waiver on a habeas corpus judge
would raise difficult questions about the suspension of the writ. As
Justice Stevens has argued, the scope of the writ is narrow, but
judges on habeas corpus have a responsibility to rectify fundamental
injustices. Errors properly raised under the writ are "errors that are
so fundamental that they infect the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or the integrity of the process by which the judgment
was obtained."'' A prisoner should be able to raise those types of
errors at any time regardless of proper preservation in some earlier
8 2
proceeding.
This recommendation thus proposes a middle ground. The
legislature should leave untouched the authority of the habeas judge
to determine the lawfulness of the applicant's confinement but
should explicitly authorize deference to the post-conviction court's
denial of relief. The habeas judge should defer unless the applicant
has raised an allegation of error that the applicant did not have a full
and fair opportunity to present to the post-conviction court or that
provides a substantial basis for questioning the fundamental fairness
of the applicant's confinement. In these two exceptional situations,
180. But see Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986), discussed supra at note 55.
181. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 544.
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the habeas corpus judge should resolve on the merits the applicant's
allegation of error.
It is also appropriate, if not desirable, for the post-conviction
judge to fulfill the function of the habeas judge. Statutes or court
rules should permit, if not encourage, judges receiving habeas
corpus applications to transfer them to the post-conviction judge if
the applicant has already filed a post-conviction petition. It is more
efficient for that judge to determine whether the application satisfies
either of the suggested criteria for a de novo determination. No
doubt the prisoner would prefer to obtain rulings from as many
judges as possible, but it does not seem unfair to give a single postconviction judge, who was not the trial judge, a continuing role in
supervising the legality of a prisoner's detention. Considerations of
efficiency support assigning that role to one judge. Of course, the
post-conviction judge cannot exclude otherjudges from considering
the legality of a prisoner's confinement, because any judge who receives an application for habeas corpus retains the authority to rule
on it. This recommendation only limits the extent to which a prisoner can require a new judge to rule on an application.
A more difficult question is whether the preclusive effect of a
prior post-conviction proceeding should apply when the petitioner
did not seek leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from an
adverse trial court determination. The Court of Appeals has held
that a habeas judge may give weight to a prior habeas judge's refusal
to discharge a prisoner.' 8 3 A post-conviction court's prior refusal to
grant relief to a petitioner deserves equal or greater weight because
the petitioner has received a hearing with counsel. The petitioner's
right to seek leave to appeal does not add much to the postconviction process. Nor does there appear to be much basis for allocating more resources to petitioner appeals. Therefore, it seems
appropriate to give the same preclusive effect to an unappealed trial
court determination as to the Court of Special Appeals' denial of
leave to appeal.
Recommendation 5: Codification of Curtis. In Curtis v. State,1 84 the
Court of Appeals interpreted the definition of "waiver" in the Post
Conviction Procedure Act to conform to what the court believed was
the legislature's intent. Although the language chosen by the legislature seemingly required a "knowing and intelligent waiver" in all
183. See, e.g., State ex rel. Eyer v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 190 Md. 767, 59
A.2d 745 (1950).
184. 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978).
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cases, the court held that standard only applied to certain basic constitutional rights for which the Supreme Court had traditionally required a knowing and intelligent waiver.'1 5 For other errors, the
Curtis court recognized that the defendant could waive them by failing to make an objection at the proper time.'8 6 This dichotomy between "fundamental rights" and other rights reflects, as
demonstrated by the Curtis court, the present approach of the
Supreme Court.
The legislature has acquiesced in the Curtis interpretation of
waiver, and is unlikely to endorse the outmoded approach of requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver for all rights. Codifying Curtis
is thus largely a matter of housekeeping, especially if the legislature
leaves to the courts the determination of what rights are "fundamental". Such a delegation appears inevitable since the question is
a constitutional one on which the courts will ultimately have the final say. Any legislative amendments should make clear, however,
that the Post Conviction Procedure Act's definitions of "waiver" and
"finally litigate" only apply to determine whether a petitioner
waived or finally litigated an allegation of error at trial or on direct
appeal. If the legislature adopts recommendations 1, 2, and 3, it will
be unnecessary to address, in the Post Conviction Procedure Act,
the preclusive effect in a post-conviction proceeding of prior postconviction, habeas corpus, or coram nobis proceedings. The single
petition rule and the elimination of duplicative habeas corpus and
coram nobis proceedings preclude that issue from arising.
Recommendation 6: Delayed Petitions. A prisoner's delay in filing a
post-conviction petition may prejudice the state's ability to respond
to it. In one verified case the state could not establish that the defendant was present at a bench conference because the memories of
the participants had faded.'8 7 In another case, it was no longer possible to transcribe the trial proceedings because the court reporter
had died and his notes were missing."' For cases such as these, the
legislature should amend the Post Conviction Procedure Act to provide the state with a laches defense. The state should be able to
obtain the dismissal of the petition if the prisoner's inexcusable de185. Id. at 148, 395 A.2d at 473.
186. Id. at 146-7, 395 A.2d at 472.
187. In this case the Honorable Martin B. Greenfield, Associate Judge, Maryland Circuit Court for the Eighth Judicial Circuit, granted the post-conviction petitioner a new
trial on May 23, 1985. The original trial took place on January 18-19, 1977.
188. Interview with the Honorable Richard B. Latham, Associate Judge, Maryland
Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit (June 1985) (discussing post-conviction proceeding brought several years previously in Montgomery County).
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lay in filing it prejudiced the state's ability to respond to it. The
federal habeas rules for state prisoners,' s9 as well as the federal
post-conviction rules for federal prisoners, 9 0 have long contained
similar provisions.
A prisoner's delay in filing a post-conviction petition may also
prejudice the state's ability to retry the prisoner who is successful in
obtaining post-conviction relief. In 1983, the Judicial Conference
Committee on Rules of Practices and Procedures drafted proposed
amendments to the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules which would have
permitted the state to raise a laches defense in these cases.' 9 ' The
Supreme Court, however, has so far declined to adopt the Committee's proposal. In addition, in Vasquez v. Hilleiy,'9 2 the Supreme
Court refused to recognize by judicial decision any such defense.
Thus, a state cannot seek federal court dismissal of a habeas corpus
petition on the ground that the prisoner's inexcusable delay in filing
it prejudiced the state's ability to retry the case. As long as the federal courts remain open to these prisoners, it makes little sense to
close the state courthouse door. The prejudice to the state is the
same regardless of which court releases the prisoner, and the state
should prefer to defend its convictions in its own courts. Thus, regardless of whether the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between the two types of prejudice discussed above is a defensible
one, 9 3 Maryland is well advised to adopt a laches defense that protects the state only from prejudice in responding to the petition. If
the Supreme Court changes its mind, then the state may respond
accordingly.

189. RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 9(a) (28 U.S.C. foil.

§ 2254 (1977)).
190. RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 9(a) (28 U.S.C.
foil. § 2255 (Supp. 1986)).
191. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, and Rules Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts, 98 F.R.D. 381, 411 (August
1983).
192. 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986).
193. The Judicial Conference Committee did not believe the distinction to be defensible and formulated a laches defense to cover both situations. See recommendation 6 in
Appendix A (proposed § 645A(d)). The committee acted before the Court decided
Hillery.
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Appendix A - Statutory Text Proposed by Criminal Law and
Procedure Committee of the Maryland Judicial Conference
Suggested Statutory Language to Implement
Recommendations 1 through 6
Recommendation 1. The legislature should amend the Post Conviction Procedure Act to limit each convicted offender to one postconviction petition per criminal trial. The amended Act should bar
second or subsequent petitions, but it should permit, under limited
circumstances, an aggrieved petitioner to move to reopen the initial
proceeding. The legislature could accomplish this objective by repealing the present section 645(f) and by enacting new sections
645(f) and (g) to read as follows:
f) Right to counsel and hearing. A petitioner is entitled to the
assistance of counsel and a hearing on his petition. The
court shall determine whether the assistance of counsel or
a hearing should be granted on a motion to reopen.
g) Single petition rule; reopenings. A petitioner may file only
one petition to set aside or correct all convictions and
sentences occurring at a single criminal trial. The petitioner shall include all available allegations of error in the
petition. The petitioner may not file a second or subsequent petition challenging the same convictions or
sentences, but he may file a motion to reopen a post-conviction proceeding if he alleges i) he did not receive the
effective assistance of counsel in the proceeding; or ii) a
court whose decisions are binding upon the lower courts of
this state has held, subsequent to the disposition of the petition, that the Constitution of the United States or Maryland imposes upon state criminal proceedings a procedural
or substantive standard not theretofore recognized and applicable retroactively to affect the validity of the petitioner's conviction. If the court reopens the proceeding
under i) above and finds that petitioner's post-conviction
counsel was ineffective, the court shall allow the petitioner
to present any allegations of error he could have presented
in the original proceeding. If the court reopens the proceeding under ii) above, the court shall consider only the
new allegations of error raised by the petitioner. The
court's denial of a petition to reopen does not constitute an
order from which an aggrieved person may seek leave to
appeal [under section 645-I of Article 27].
Recommendation 2. The legislature should amend the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article to eliminate habeas corpus as a duplica-
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tive remedy. Such duplication can be eliminated by permitting a
judge who receives an application for the writ to treat the application as a petition for post-conviction relief providing the applicant
has not filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The legislature
could accomplish this objective by adding a new section 3-702(c) to
read as follows:
c. Treatment of certain petitions as post-conviction petitions.
Upon receiving a petition for the writ which seeks relief
available under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, the
judge may inquire whether the petitioner has filed a petition under the Act. If the judge determines that the petitioner has not filed a petition under the Act, he may sign an
order treating the petition for the writ as a petition filed
under the Act, unless he finds that the post-conviction remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the
petitioner's detention. Upon signing such an order, the
judge shall transmit the petition, a certified copy of the order, and any other pertinent papers to the court in which
the petitiofier's conviction took place. Upon such transfer
the procedure shall be as in a Post Conviction Procedure
proceeding.
Upon adoption of this amendment, the Rules Committee will
need to revise accordingly Rule Z55.
Recommendation 3. The legislature should amend the Post Conviction Procedure Act to eliminate coram nobis entirely, or at least
limit it to cases in which post-conviction and habeas corpus relief
are no longer available (i.e., cases in which the convicted offender is
no longer "in custody"). The legislature could accomplish the latter
objective (partial elimination) by amending section 645A(e) to add
the following new sentence after the first sentence:
The remedy does supersede relief by way of coram nobis in
cases where the applicant for the writ is incarcerated or on
parole or probation.
Upon adoption of this amendment, the legislature could delete from
section 645(e) the references to former Article 31B and to appeals
pending in the Court of Appeals on June 1, 1958, and add a crossreference to the new section 3-702(c) of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article.
Recommendation 4. The legislature should amend the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article to specify the preclusive effect in a
habeas corpus proceeding of prior post-conviction and habeas
corpus proceedings. The legislature could accomplish this objective
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by repealing the present section 3-703 and adding new sections 3703(a) and (b) to read as follows:
a. Priorpost-conviction proceeding. The judge may refuse to
issue the writ if he determines that the petitioner, confined
as a result of a sentence for a criminal offense, raised or
could have raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding the
grounds he now raises in a petition for the writ. In exercising his discretion the judge may consider whether the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to present the
grounds in the post-conviction proceeding and whether
any new grounds provide a substantial basis for questioning the fundamental fairness of the petitioner's
confinement.
b. Prior habeas corpus proceeding. The judge may refuse to
issue the writ if he determines that the petitioner, confined
as a result of a sentence for a criminal offense, raised or
could have raised in a prior habeas corpus proceeding the
grounds he now raises in a petition for the writ. In exercising his discretion the judge may consider whether the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to present the
grounds in the prior habeas corpus proceeding and
whether the grounds provide a substantial basis for questioning the fundamental fairness of the petitioner's
confinement.
Upon adoption of this amendment, the Rules Committee
should consider amending Rule Z55 to ensure that if a habeas
corpus judge transfers a habeas application to the convicting court
(already authorized by section 7-202(b)(1)), the transfer will be to
the judge who previously ruled on the prisoner's post-conviction
petition.
Recommendation 5. The legislature should amend the Post Conviction Procedure Act to redefine "finally litigated" and "waived" to
be consistent with recent judicial decisions and with these recommendations. The legislature could accomplish this objective by repealing the present sections 645(A)(b) and (c) and by enacting new
sections 645A(b) and (c) to read as follows:
b) When allegations of errorfinally litigated. For purposes of
this subtitle, an allegation of error is finally litigated when
the Court of Special Appeals has rendered a decision on
the merits thereof on direct appeal of the defendant's
conviction.
c) When allegation of error waived. For the purposes of this
subtitle, an allegation of error is waived if the petitioner
could have made the allegation before trial, at trial, or on
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direct appeal but did not make the allegation, unless the
court shall find that the allegation of error involves a fundamental right which the petitioner must knowingly and intelligently waive or that some other special circumstance
excuses the petitioner's failure to raise the allegation. The
burden of proving special circumstances shall be on the petitioner. If the court finds that the applicable standard is
that of a knowing and intelligent waiver, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the petitioner's failure to allege
the error when he could have done so before trial, at trial,
or on direct appeal was an intelligent and knowing waiver.
Upon adoption of this amendment, the legislature should also repeal section 645A(d) and the final two lines in section 645A(a).
Recommendation 6. The legislature should amend the Post Conviction Procedure Act to afford the state a laches defense where the
prisoner's inexcusable delay in filing a post-conviction petition
prejudices the state's ability to respond to the petition or to retry
the petitioner. The legislature could accomplish this objective by
enacting a new section 645A(d) to read as follows:
d) Delayed petitions. A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition or to retry the petioner by delay in its
filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on allegations that he could not have had knowledge of by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances
prejudicial to the state occurred.

